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THESIS

THE SCALE SHIFT OF COCALERO MOVEMENTS IN PERU AND BOLIVIA

by

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THE SCALE SHIFT OF COCALERO MOVEMENTS IN PERU AND BOLIVIA

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to explain variation in the outcomes of cocalero mobilization in Peru and Bolivia. When cocaine became a popular drug in the United States in the late 1970s to early 1980s, governments of the coca-producing countries in the Eastern Andes began implementing policies that included forcible eradication of coca plants, often with U.S. assistance. Cocaleros in Bolivia not only protested against government policy, but also formed a national movement using political alliances that included indigenous and labor unions. In contrast, Peru's cocaleros also mobilized against forced eradication, but a coherent national movement never materialized. This is a problem because social movement literature indicates Peru and Bolivia share many factors that should contribute to increasing levels of mobilization: decentralization measures, a consistent threat from national and international entities, neoliberal reform and backlash, and a recent turn to the political left. This thesis argues that cocalero movements first require political associational space before they can expand their movement through political alliances and achieve an upward shift in the scale of their movement. Furthermore, it finds that when cocalero movements use credible and resonant frames of protest, they are more likely to mobilize broader support and realize their goals.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.....	1
B.	IMPORTANCE.....	3
C.	PROBLEMS AND FINDINGS.....	4
D.	THE RECENT TRAJECTORY OF COCALEROS: FORCED ERADICATION LEADS TO MOVEMENT FORMATION.....	6
1.	Bolivia: An Active Cocalero Base on the Rise.....	6
2.	Peru: Struggles to Form a National Cocalero Movement.....	7
E.	LITERATURE REVIEW	9
F.	METHODS AND SOURCES	17
G.	THESIS OVERVIEW	17
II.	PERU’S COCALEROS: FRAMED AS DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND PART OF SHINING PATH.....	19
A.	INITIAL ATTEMPTS TO FORM A COCALERO MOVEMENT	21
1.	Framing and Violence in Protest	21
2.	Cocalero Problems with Identity	23
B.	LACK OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONAL SPACE	23
1.	International Pressures	23
2.	Shining Path Coercion and National Antinarcotics Policy	25
C.	INABILITY TO SCALE UP FOLLOWING DECENTRALIZATION...30	
D.	CONCLUSION	31
III.	BOLIVIA’S COCALEROS: FRAMING AND OPPORTUNITIES.....	33
A.	SUCCESSFUL FRAMING AS INDIGENOUS AND PEASANTS.....	34
B.	POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONAL SPACE	38
C.	THE REPERTOIRE OF PROTEST: TACTICS TO GAIN SUPPORTERS	40
D.	DECENTRALIZATION AIDS THE FORMATION OF A POLITICAL PARTY	41
E.	THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COCA-COCAINE ISSUE ON THE BOLIVIAN ECONOMY	43
F.	GOVERNMENT COUNTER-FRAMING AND COMMITMENT TO ERADICATION INHIBITS COCALEROS DURING THE BANZER REGIME.....	46
G.	CONCLUSION	47
IV.	RISE OF THE MAS AND PERU’S “BOLIVIANIZATION” THAT NEVER HAPPENED.....	49
A.	THE RISE OF THE MAS PARTY	51
1.	A Pragmatic and Inclusive Approach Helps the MAS Build Alliances	53
B.	PERU’S ATTEMPTS AT BOLIVIANIZATION.....	54
1.	Peru’s Cocaleros Appear United Nationally	55

a.	<i>Frames of Protest: Radical and Pragmatic Approaches</i>	55
b.	<i>Coca Leaders' Credibility Problems</i>	57
2.	Absence of Sympathizers.....	57
C.	INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND THE WEAK STATE	59
D.	INTERNAL DIVISIONS LEAD TO A PURSUIT OF ALLIANCES	59
E.	ANOTHER LOOK AT DECENTRALIZATION EFFORTS	61
F.	COMPARING THE LEFT-TURN	62
G.	CONCLUSION	64
V.	CONCLUSION	67
A.	THE "SCORES"	67
B.	THE CHOICE BETWEEN RADICAL AND PRAGMATIC FRAMES.....	69
C.	THE WAY FORWARD FOR BOLIVIA'S MOVEMENT: IS ATTRACTING BROADER SUPPORT POSSIBLE?	70
D.	WILL PERU'S COCALERO MOVEMENT EVER REACH THE NATIONAL LEVEL?	70
E.	IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY	70
F.	FRAMING AND ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT.....	71
	LIST OF REFERENCES	73
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	77

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAPHC-AHMPA	Asociación de Agricultores y Productores de Hoja de Coca del Alto Huallaga, Monzón y Padre Abad
ADN	Acción Democrática Nacional
AIDSEP	Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana
ANAPCOCA	Asociación Nacional de Productores de Coca
APCOCAS	Asociación de Productores y Agricultores de Hoja de Coca de la Selva de Puno
APRA	Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana
CAPHC	Consejo Andino de Productores de Hoja de Coca
CEP	Confederación de Empresarios Privados
COB	Central Obrera Boliviana
CONAPA	Coordinadora Nacional de Productores Agrícolas
CONPACCP	Confederación Nacional de Productores Agropecuarios de las Cuencas Cocaleras de Perú
CORAH	Control y Reducción del Cultivo de la Coca en el Alto Huallaga
CSUTCB	Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
ENACO	Empresa Nacional de la Coca
FEPAVRAE	Federación de Productores del Valle del Río Apurímac-Ene:
FEPCACYL	Federación Provincial de Campesinos de la Convención, Yanatile y Lares
FETCTC	Federación Especial de Trabajadores Campesinos del Trópico de Cochabamba
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IU	Izquierda Unidad
JTF	Joint Task Force
LPP	Law of Popular Participation
MAS	Movimiento Al Socialismo
MIR	Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria

MNR	Movimiento Revolucionario Nacional
NEP	New Economic Policy
PEAH	Proyecto Especial Alto Huallaga
PNP	Partido Nacionalista Peruano
UHV	Upper Huallaga Valley
UMOPAR	Unidad Movile de Patrullaje Rural
UN	United Nations
UPD	Unidad Democrática y Popular
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VRAE	Valley Between the Apurimac and Ene Rivers

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis research will seek to explain variation in the outcomes of coca grower mobilization in Peru and Bolivia. In Bolivia, mobilization grew from the local to the national level, involving linkages with other sectors; in Peru, organization has remained largely regional and limited to coca growers. The activism of coca growers, or cocaleros, has shaped Andean politics at the local, regional, national, and even international levels in recent years. The conflicts birthed from the escalating issue surrounding the use of the coca plant can certainly be categorized under what social movement scholars call “contentious politics.”¹

This thesis centers on the coca-cocaine issue, which is largely a product of the twentieth century. However, its salience has spiked over the last three decades as cocaleros emerged as a social movement in the Andes. In Peru and Bolivia, unions of coca growers formed to push their national governments to represent the farmers whose most profitable crop remained the coca plant, despite government efforts to provide alternative development.² The coca unions both borrowed and learned from other social movements as the unions protested the state eradication measures enacted against them and their coca fields. For example, early indigenous movements in Bolivia, as well as the coca unions, focused on organizing as peasants to obtain social services and benefit from government land reform policy.³

Traditionally, the indigenous peoples in the high *selva* region of the Eastern Andes are the ones who have grown and consumed the dried coca leaf. Added to this traditional consumption, prior to the twentieth century, Peru and Bolivia grew thriving

¹ Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, “Dynamics of Contention,” *Social Movement Studies* 2, no. 1 (April 2003): 99–102, doi:10.1080/14742837.2003.10035370.

² Alternative development is widely considered the best alternative to forced eradication of coca fields, as it provides farmers with suitable crops to replace the coca plant. The economic viability of such plans is widely contested, however. For a deeper discussion, see Coletta A Youngers and Eileen Rosin, *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: the Impact of U.S. Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2005).

³ Deborah Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 156.

legal industries exporting coca and cocaine to the United States and Germany. In the mid-twentieth century, an international crusade against cocaine began, which saw the intersection of the coca growers with the larger illicit drug industry as a prime target for anti-drug policy.⁴ Since the late 1970s, government eradication policy targeting the coca plant as the supply side of the cocaine production chain has presented deep challenges to indigenous coca growers. In response, a new social movement emerged in both countries in opposition to their national governments.

Distinctions between Peru and Bolivia's indigenous people and cocaleros are difficult because the cocaleros are a subset of indigenous in both countries. Additionally, outsiders often view the Bolivian cocalero movement, *prima facie*, as an indigenous movement. Cocaleros have often had to shift the over-arching identity of their organizations to increase participation. As a result, the lines have become increasingly blurred between coca farmers, peasants, and ethnic indigenous people. A variety of factors influenced the governments of Peru and Bolivia to either accommodate or repress cocaleros involved in protest. Such factors include pressure from the international community to meet certification requirements, views on whether the drug problem is a supply- or demand-side issue, the economic benefit of the drug trade to their country, and the mobilization of interest groups, especially the cocaleros.⁵ This thesis specifically focuses on the factors that affect cocalero mobilization.

Of the coca-producing countries in the Andes, only Peru and Bolivia have seen significant popular organization to protect the right to grow the coca plant, though their goals vary across time and across country.⁶ In Colombia, where Indians either had disappeared or had been assimilated into mestizo societies by the 1940s, there was little

⁴ Paul Gootenberg, *Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 9–12.

⁵ Raul Rocha, "The Political Economy of Counterdrug Policy in the Case of Bolivia, 1997–2006," master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School.

⁶ For example, some cocaleros movements have made it their goal to legalize the indigenous consumption of the coca leaf while others have gone as far as attempting to legitimize the export of the leaf for worldwide consumption.

resistance to evolving prohibitionist efforts.⁷ Since the turn of the twenty-first century, cocaleros in Peru and Bolivia have gained political importance in their respective countries, though the extent to which they were able to scale up the level of their movement through political alliances varied. Only Bolivia's indigenous groups have lobbied for decriminalization of the coca plant and successfully worked through national and international institutions. On the other hand, Peru's groups have had limited success in achieving temporary recognition of traditional coca cultivation rights from regional governments, and not the national government. This study analyzes variation across country and across time to determine why Peru's cocalero movement remained regional while Bolivia's movement synthesized into a strong national lobby with extensive political power.

B. IMPORTANCE

This research will inform our understanding of the politics surrounding cocalero movements in Peru and Bolivia, countries that are top-three suppliers of coca feeding the world cocaine market. Explaining cross-national variation across the two countries in the strength and scope of the movements will help us better understand the domestic politics of both countries, broadly speaking, including political instability and the state-led violence that cocalero movements have triggered. On the other hand, state actions also have influenced the trajectory of the cocalero movements. The rights of cocaleros to plant, grow, market, and sell coca have been consistently challenged in Peru and Bolivia over the past few decades, leading to violent protests and allegations of human rights abuses in both countries. Avoiding such conflicts should be the goal of any well-informed policy. Finally, because the debate over the legalization and decriminalization of coca has spilled onto the international scene within the last decade, the past, current, and potential influence of coca groups in Bolivia and Peru has relevance beyond the borders of both countries, specifically, in terms of their ability and willingness to cooperate multilaterally on drug trafficking and drug supply reduction.

⁷ Francisco Thoumi, *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 34.

C. PROBLEMS AND FINDINGS

This thesis seeks to explain the causal mechanisms of cocalero mobilization and why such efforts to scale up the level of their movement either succeeded or failed. Every social movement must go through a dynamic process to create collective action, whether it is at a local, regional, national, or international level. When a social movement has mobilized enough support to have influence at a new level, it is called as *scale shift*. Social movement scholars Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam originally defined the term in their work *Dynamics of Contention*, as “a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions leading to broader contention involving a wide range of actors and bridging their claims and identities.”⁸ Because not every grievance of a social movement can be rendered meaningful, individual events that will have the greatest impact and mobilizing support must be selected and articulated. David Snow and Robert Benford label this concept *framing*, defining it as “an interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action.”⁹ While social movements should be expected to use frames to mobilize further support, an opposing movement (or the state) can also be expected to use frames to marginalize their opposition.

There has been much work dedicated to understanding the mobilization of indigenous groups in the Andes, but to a lesser extent the cocaleros, who do not fall neatly into a single category like indigenous or peasant. Rather, the cocaleros focus on mobilizing around an issue that some governments outside the Andes, including for instance, the U.S. government, have traditionally viewed as a drug control problem. Peru and Bolivia share a common history of cultivation of the coca plant, indigenous mobilization, neoliberal reform and associated backlash, government policies promoting coca eradication and alternative development, and a recent turn to the political left. Yet the outcomes of Peru and Bolivia’s cocalero movements vary. Specifically, Bolivia’s

⁸ Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam, “Scale Shift in Transnational Contention,” in *Transnational Protest and Global Activism* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005), 121–150.

⁹ Hank Johnston and John A Noakes, *Frames of Protest* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2005).

cocaleros used frames surrounding their indigenous culture to advance their movement and were able to scale shift from local to regional, national, and international levels. Peru's cocalero movement scale shift never truly happened, but not for lack of trying.

As a first task, this thesis seeks to explain frames and tactics used by cocaleros to broaden their support base and achieve a scale shift. Since cocaleros in Peru and Bolivia used some of the same frames and tactics but with different outcomes, this thesis also shows that there are pragmatic and radical approaches to framing; selecting the right one may be the difference between success and failure. Bolivia's cocaleros used indigenous and peasant frames to secure their position as the leading national social movement. While some of the frames seem radical from an outsider's perspective, their approach was truly pragmatic, reciprocating with other social movements and winning broad-based support. To form a political party that saw success at the national level, Bolivia's cocaleros had to use less radical frames and make some compromises to win the support of the urban and mestizo classes. In contrast, Peru's cocaleros experienced repression under the heavy hand of the national government, which framed cocaleros as drug traffickers. The government's counter-framing overpowered that of the cocaleros because in part, the cocaleros found economic protection from government eradication forces by allowing the radical Sendero Luminoso insurgency to live in the coca cultivation zones. As the government maintained its policies that limited political associational space, a radical or pragmatic approach to framing became irrelevant. When opportunity space opened in the 2000s, Peru's cocaleros struggled to form a national movement because they initially adopted a radical stance that alienated outsiders. The pragmatic approach was eventually used, but internal divisions within the movement kept it regional.

As a second task, this thesis examines international, national, and subnational factors that may contribute to a cocalero movement's scale shift. In Bolivia and Peru, international pressure to reduce or eliminate the supply of coca was constant. In both cases, cocaleros used an anti-U.S. discourse as a key frame to mobilize support. In nearly every instance, this frame mobilized cocaleros from disparate regions and attracted outside support. At the national level, the government used counter-frames with varied

success between the two countries. In the case of Peru, the frames worked because people could easily associate cocaleros with drug traffickers and terrorists. In Bolivia, the connection was more difficult to link. When a country used forced eradication measures, the act provided an impetus for cocaleros to mobilize in protest, but there is not a direct causal link between the measures and a scale shift for cocaleros. Indeed, in Bolivia the largest forced eradication operation was almost completely successful by the government's standards, but cocaleros there did not achieve a scale shift until other opportunities were made available. Lastly, this thesis finds that subnational factors like decentralization only contribute to a scale shift if other social movements are already allied behind cocaleros.

As a third and final task, this thesis examines the eventual turn to the political left in Peru and Bolivia at the national level. When Evo Morales was elected in 2005, his victory symbolized the end of the traditional party system in Bolivia and a complete disenchantment with free market reforms enacted in the 1980s. Conversely, when Ollanta Humala became President of Peru in 2011, his election symbolized a turn to the political left, but the majority of Peruvians thought favorably of the results that the same market reforms brought them. Cocaleros in Peru, however, were among those hardest hit by such reforms and attempted to channel what they thought should be a national grievance. Therefore, a turn to the political left is not a causal factor for enabling a scale shift.

The next section is a description of the recent trajectory of cocalero movements in both countries. The description will cover some of the main events involving cocaleros, from the start of government-led eradication efforts to the formation of cocalero unions. This discussion will set the basis for a further analysis of cocalero mobilization.

D. THE RECENT TRAJECTORY OF COCALEROS: FORCED ERADICATION LEADS TO MOVEMENT FORMATION

1. Bolivia: An Active Cocalero Base on the Rise

Bolivia's cocalero movement has its roots in both indigenous and peasant-based organizations. When the government enacted a 1988 law mandating the elimination of

all coca cultivation besides that dedicated for traditional use, the cocaleros mobilized. This law meant that the thousands of farmers that had migrated to the tropical Chapare region to grow coca were left with the dilemma of clashing with the state or attempting to grow unsustainable alternative crops.¹⁰ The most aggressive anti-coca government initiative in Bolivia began almost a decade later in 1997. President Hugo Banzer's (1997–2001) *Plan Dignidad* represented the greatest challenge to coca growers in the history of Bolivia, as it sought to reduce illegal coca production to zero within five years.¹¹ As the struggle between coca growers and the national government intensified, even the legal and traditional coca growing Yungas region was targeted for eradication. Since the end of the Banzer presidency in 2001, Bolivian politics have taken a gradual turn to the political left. Evo Morales has led Bolivia's indigenous coca grower unions to increased political salience. The coca growers were able to form political alliances across geographic boundaries and across disparate social groups in order to form a strong national movement and eventually a political party. In the most recent display of cocalero political strength, Bolivia's coca growers won a concession from the United Nations as a vote to remove coca from the 1961 UN Drug Convention's schedule of illicit substances passed with overwhelming support in January 2013.¹²

2. Peru: Struggles to Form a National Cocalero Movement

In Peru, coca growers found themselves caught between the state and the Sendero Luminoso Maoist insurgency from the early 1980s, and shifted their alliances from one side to the other depending on which group represented a greater threat. First, the government began its eradication effort in 1981 called the Special Project to Reduce Coca Cultivation in the Alto Huallaga (CORAH), accompanied by a government program

¹⁰ Kenneth Lehman, "A 'Medicine of Death'? U.S. Policy and Political Disarray in Bolivia, 1985–2006," in *Addicted to Failure*, ed. Brian Loveman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006), 133.

¹¹ Kathryn Ledebur, "Bolivia: Clear Consequences," in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy*, eds. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 2005), 154.

¹² Transnational Institute, "Bolivia Wins a Rightful Victory on the Coca Leaf," news release, January 11, 2013, United Nations Drug Control Info, <http://www.undrugcontrol.info/en/newsroom/press-releases/item/4267-bolivia-wins-a-rightful-victory-on-the-coca-leaf>, accessed March, 2013.

for alternative development, Special Project for Alto Huallaga (PEAH) in 1982. The initial incursions of the eradication forces in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV)—Peru’s center of coca cultivation—met violent resistance from coca growers. Soon, the Maoist Sendero Luminoso guerillas found a safe haven in the UHV and integrated themselves by protecting coca farmers from government eradication forces. While the strategy worked to keep CORAH from accomplishing their mission, the cocaleros soon experienced life under Sendero, which placed severe restrictions on personal freedoms. The cocaleros then aligned themselves with the Peruvian Army to defend against the insurgents.¹³ The government therefore was able to successfully ally with coca growers to weaken Sendero, though it meant compromising on their eradication goals.¹⁴

Coca growers in Peru organized and responded rapidly to government eradication measures in the late 1990s, as a period of relative non-confrontation between the state and coca growers came to an end. President Fujimori wished to regain the lost perception of his cooperation on drug control programs and incidentally reignited the anger of the cocaleros.¹⁵ Later, now under President Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006), despite cocaleros showing their ability to gain concessions from the national government through their march on Lima in 2003, the following year demonstrated that Peru’s coca growers were fractionalized and in conflict with each other. One thousand cocaleros responded to U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) eradication efforts in Carabaya province with a strike and seizure of the hydroelectric station at San Gabán.¹⁶ Further protests by cocaleros shut down roads and commerce in the San Martín department. Under these conditions, regional politicians began to realize they could secure support for the regional governments through accommodation. For coca growers, the response of regional politicians has been to unilaterally legalize cultivation of the coca plant. In 2005, the

¹³ Enrique Obando, “U.S. Policy Toward Peru: At Odds for Twenty Years,” in *Addicted to Failure*, ed. Brian Loveman, trans. Lynn Eddy-Zambrano (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006), 171–174.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Isaias Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy,” in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy*, eds. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2005), 211–213.

¹⁶ Obando, “U.S. Policy toward Peru: At Odds for Twenty Years,” 191.

departments of Cuzco, Huánuco, and Puno all declared coca cultivation legal within their respective jurisdictions.¹⁷ An eventual turn to the political left under Ollanta Humala (2011 to present) has done little for Peru's cocaleros. A series of empty promises has left the cocaleros in a state of limbo, though recent analyses show increases in coca cultivation under his administration.¹⁸

In summary, Peru's government has made some concessions to coca growers, but overall it has maintained a more amicable approach in dealing with international pressure to eradicate coca.¹⁹ While Bolivia's coca growers rose in importance, Peru's coca growers most recently failed to become an integral part of Ollanta Humala's leftist government (2011–present), even though they were a key demographic for his election in 2011 and his near-election in 2006.²⁰ Peru's coca growers have been able to force regional governments to acquiesce to their demands, but have not created linkages that should allow them to become a national influence.²¹

E. LITERATURE REVIEW

The argument presented here, which rests on insights about framing and scale shifts in the literature on social movements, moves beyond other research on cocalero movements, which cannot account for the variation between Peru and Bolivia. Much of the literature focuses on international factors, and primarily seeks to explain the role of foreign pressure, especially from the United States. Others look at national level factors, like economic and political changes. Still others use subnational factors like decentralization to explain the rise of cocaleros.

First, there are international factors. Resistance to international pressure to regulate coca is a long-standing tradition in Peru and Bolivia. Paul Gootenberg writes

¹⁷ Ibid., 191–194.

¹⁸ United Nations, *World Drug Report 2013* (New York, NY: United Nations Publications, 2013).

¹⁹ Pablo G. Dreyfus, "When All the Evils Come Together: Cocaine, Corruption, and Shining Path in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, 1980 to 1995," *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 15, no. 4 (1999).

²⁰ Maxwell Cameron, "Peru: The Left Turn that Wasn't," in *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*, eds. Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 375–398.

²¹ Rojas, "Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy," 185.

that looking back as far as the League of Nations, Peru “consistently ignored League cocaine initiatives,” and Bolivia “rose in spirited defense of indigenous coca.”²² More recently, the United Nations Drug Convention of 1961 targeted coca, including coca leaf chewing, for extermination. Since then, enormous pressure to take action against the coca fields and their cultivators has come from the governments of the countries that consume cocaine, especially in the United States. At nearly every opportunity, the U.S. government has prioritized coca eradication over strengthening democracy and institutions, while ignoring violations of human rights.²³ This is normally a result of the U.S. position that the cocaine problem can be handled on the supply side through eradication of the coca plant in the production countries. The hypothesis of international pressure suggests that cocaleros organize and gain strength in response to what is seen as international intervention in domestic affairs.

Importantly, the national governments of Peru and Bolivia have not initially been the ones decrying such intervention. Rather, the cocaleros have consistently denounced the “imperialist Yanquis” from the north, causing some presidential candidates to use the same rhetoric in order to win their support. Scholar Enrique Obando identified Peru’s presidential candidate Ollanta Humala as a nationalist-populist who nearly followed the lead of Evo Morales in 2006 as he campaigned in the Ayacucho and Cusco regions principally to win support among the coca growers. Though Humala promised a definite “end to foreign military (read: U.S.) involvement in the drug war,”²⁴ he acknowledged that the country would still likely receive foreign financial assistance.²⁵ Even part of Yashar’s hypothesis is that pressure from the U.S. government bolstered the Bolivian cocalero movement in the Chapare where the debate over the destination of its coca crop was particularly fierce.²⁶ International pressure leads to the hypothesis that cocaleros

²² Gootenberg, *Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug*, 211.

²³ Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy,” 187.

²⁴ Obando, “U.S. Policy Toward Peru: At Odds for Twenty Years,” 189.

²⁵ Ibid. Indeed, under Humala, United States aid was \$84 million in 2012, of which \$29 million went to combat drug trafficking. See <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121007/DEFREG02/310070005/U-S-Peru-Boost-Military-Ties-Fight-Terrorism-Drugs>.

²⁶ Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*, 186.

have significant leverage over national domestic politics as long as that pressure exists. At least on its face, this hypothesis seems not to explain variation between Peru and Bolivia; though international pressure has continued to be a challenge for both countries, cocaleros in Bolivia have exerted significant influence on their national government while Peru's cocaleros have little to no voice in their national government on this issue.

Second, domestic national factors—both economic and political—might play an important role in explaining the degree to which coca growers mobilize. Neoliberalism is the main economic factor scholars identify for creating social turmoil and in the case of Peru and Bolivia, a backlash. When Alberto Fujimori courted private investment in the mid-1990s, it resulted in unintended consequences, including mass layoffs from previously subsidized national sectors and a collapse in agricultural prices. These systemic shocks caused by national policy contributed to the numbers of coca growers in Peru, providing a more robust pool for organization and mobilization. A similar experience happened in Bolivia with the tin miners; following the collapse of the tin sector in the mid-1980s, many workers migrated to the Chapare region where they began to grow coca. Additionally, the competition created by the opening of markets to international competition drove many would-be fruit and vegetable farmers in Bolivia to cultivate coca as their cash crop. Given that in both countries radical neoliberal reform took place that encouraged coca growing and, presumably, coca eradication, this factor alone cannot explain why Bolivia's cocalero movement has been national, whereas the Peruvian movement has been regional.

Other scholars discount neoliberalism as a causal factor for cocalero organization, relying heavily on the hypothesis that threats of government eradication are the main reason why coca growers take action to further their political interests. Enrique Obando does not identify the neoliberal experience of Peru as an important factor for the emergence of cocaleros as a political group, but he does warn that continued attempts at eradication could lead Peru's growers to join internationally with Bolivian coca unions among other nefarious consequences. Obando's analysis on Peru agrees with other scholars the importance of a continued threat of eradication: Government pressure to eradicate coca is likely to lead to alliances that permit cocaleros to scale up the level of

their movement to national or international salience. That Bolivia was able to achieve this since Evo Morales's presidency under favorable political conditions for coca growers while Peru's cocaleros were unable under generally threatening circumstances presents a significant problem in the literature.

Moving beyond national counterdrug policy, some scholars suggest that more complex political conditions in Peru and Bolivia could explain the regional versus national form of cocalero movements, using social movement theory. Deborah Yashar's *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge* describes how indigenous groups were able to mobilize under changing citizenship regimes.²⁷ While Bolivia and Peru are similar cases, Peru is an anomaly, in that indigenous mobilization has been limited and regional. Yashar concludes that if the same political conditions that explain the first wave of organization in Bolivia and other Andean countries existed in Peru, we could predict significant organization there as well.²⁸

In Bolivia, existing transcommunity networks, an opening in political association space beginning with the 1982 democratic transition, and a clear incentive to mobilize with the dismantling of state programs to support the rural sector in the 1980s, were the main drivers of movements. The literature suggests that the cocaleros, a "second-generation movement," were able to learn from the past indigenous movements, and at crucial moments secure political alliances to advance their interests on a national level.²⁹

In contrast, Yashar identifies Peru's lack of both "political associational space" (i.e., space to organize politically) and "transcommunity networks" that connect different indigenous communities as the cause of a very weak, regional first-generation movement. The socially fragmenting conflict between the state and the Sendero Luminoso insurgency of the 1980s–1990s was the main factor inhibiting Peru's indigenous

²⁷ Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*.

²⁸ Ibid., 278.

²⁹ Nancy Grey Postero, *Now We are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 43–44.

movements from organizing in any serious way on either a regional or national level.³⁰ One critic of Yashar's work identified a problem central to this thesis: "Why have the Peruvian indigenous peoples not rebuilt these networks or created new ones since the end of the civil war? Is it because even after the close of the war, Fujimori did not allow sufficient political associational space?"³¹ I utilize research on social movement mobilization and Peruvian politics in general to support my argument that civil conflict inhibited Peru's coca growers from building political consensus any more than in a regional context through the 1990s. My research builds on Yashar's work to show that while political associational space is a crucial for cocaleros to scale shift, the way a movement is framed and the internal dynamics also affect the ability to forge broad based alliances. Furthermore, this thesis shows that in the Peruvian case, the transcommunity networks destroyed by Sendero were not reconstructed under the Toledo regime. Though Toledo implemented significant decentralization measures, cocaleros had to compete with other social movements for positions in the municipal governments and therefore could not take advantage of them in the same way as the Bolivian cocaleros.³²

The recent turn to the left presents an interesting hypothesis for why coca growers should be able to increase their mobilizational and organizational capacity. Conventional wisdom suggests that right wing or authoritarian governments are more likely to align themselves with international governments and champion prohibitionist and eradication policies. By the same token, leftist government should be expected to promote social drug control strategies, including an end to eradication policies and the promotion of alternative development. We see in Bolivia that this was the case, as Morales reversed government eradication policies and promoted social control to prevent drug traffickers

³⁰ Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*, 262.

³¹ Jeffery R. Webber, "Indigenous Struggle in Latin America: The Perilous Invisibility of Capital and Class," *Latin American Politics and Society* 49, no. 3 (Oct, 2007), 199.

³² Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*; Mirella Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru* (Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers, 2009).

from obtaining coca for processing into cocaine.³³ In explaining the rise of the current leftist regime in Bolivia, Raúl Madrid identifies the appeal of Morales' Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party to a broad base of alienated voters. The MAS originated from the cocaleros in the Chapare, but championed multiple causes in addition to agrarian reform, such as opposing trade liberalization and other neoliberal policies, and the nationalization of natural resources.³⁴ The twenty-first century is therefore a critical juncture for Bolivia's cocaleros as the MAS sought political alliances with other social movements in Bolivia, especially the mestizo dominated groups.³⁵

Peru's experience with a political left turn is more ambiguous than the Bolivia case. Some recent publications point to the presidential elections of 2006 when Ollanta Humala lost the race to Alan García as the near turning point in Peruvian politics. Though the coca-producing regions overwhelmingly voted for Humala, García's political calculus paid off: "a party that kept urban voters content could win without the support of the highlands and the Amazon."³⁶ That cocaleros in Peru failed to form political alliances with urban mestizos is not in question, but explaining why they did not or could not is a partial goal of this thesis. I will use literature on social movements in Peru as well as Peru's experience with neopopulism to support the argument that cocaleros remained a mere regional movement because of a stigma in the country against the left for past or perceived association with revolutionary violence and that Peru's experience under neoliberalism differed greatly from Bolivia leading to fewer opportunities for political alliances.

Third, there are subnational factors that may be of particular importance to the cocalero movements in Peru and Bolivia. Along with neoliberal reforms in the 1990s, the governments of Peru and Bolivia made attempts to decentralize control over their rural

³³ Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl, "Social Control: Bolivia's New Approach to Coca Reduction," *Latin American Perspectives* 37, no. 4 (July 01, 2010), 197–213.

³⁴ Raul L. Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies of the Movimiento Al Socialismo," in *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*, eds. Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 239.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 241.

³⁶ Cameron, "Peru: The Left Turn that Wasn't," 376.

areas as a result of international pressures.³⁷ Postero writes that because of the neoliberal exclusion of Indians, “Bolivians are moving past neoliberal forms of multiculturalism—and indeed ‘indigenous politics’—to a new era of citizenship practices and contestation focused on redefining the state and popular access to it.”³⁸ In her view, cocaleros have been successful at promoting both peasant agriculturalist agendas as well as identifying themselves within the terms of international indigenous rights discourse. Since the ethnic and peasant-based Katarista movement of the 1970s, cocaleros have spotlighted themselves as representatives of Bolivia’s indigenous people. Postero similarly forecasts the ability of other cases to experience strong indigenous movements when states experiment with conditions of multiculturalism and neoliberalism.³⁹ She postulates that cocaleros have been successful in Bolivia because they identified themselves with the indigenous rights movement at a crucial moment when the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (LPP) decentralized financial and political control and extended democratic rights to the rural indigenous by creating municipalities that required thousands of representatives.⁴⁰ Two years later, the 1996 Electoral Law created an opportunity for greater participation of indigenous people on a national level as the national Congress switched to a hybrid proportional representation system. Under the new system, political parties sent their candidates to compete on a district level. In the first election since the law was reformed, only four indigenous candidates were elected to Congress and all of them came from the Chapare coca growers’ movement.⁴¹

While this dynamic demonstrates the strength of the Chapare cocaleros vis à vis other indigenous groups, the opportunity for the cocaleros to gain a larger share of seats in Congress was limited by their geographic scope. Therefore, they needed to ally with other organizations to increase representation. In 1999 elections, they did just that by convincing peasant organizations to adopt their party doctrine. By 2002, the Chapare

³⁷ Postero, *Now We are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia*, 127.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., 7.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia* (London: Zed Books, 2006), 126.

coca growers occupied one-fourth of the national Congress seats, thereby securing their spot as the second largest political party in Bolivia.⁴² Peru also decentralized control, granting greater power to regional or departmental governments amidst neoliberal reforms. We should expect similar outcomes for cocaleros in Peru and Bolivia, but this is not the case. I will utilize literature on decentralization efforts in Peru and Bolivia to show that laws originating at the national government level that decentralize authority and increase representation contribute to strong regional organization, but further political alliances are necessary to scale up an organization to the national level.

Finally, some scholars identify geographic explanations for why cocaleros would exert national or regional influence. Many of Peru's coca grower troubles lie in the inability to readily identify an area where quality coca grew, unlike Bolivia, which grew the best Andean coca in the Yungas region.⁴³ As a result, the Peruvian coca growers are spread out among the Huallaga Valley, in the northern highlands, and the valley between the Apurimac and Ene Rivers (the VRAE), and isolated areas in the south near Cuzco and Ayacucho, in the southern highlands. Comparatively, Bolivia's coca growing regions are limited to the Yungas region, near the capital city of La Paz, and the Chapare, in the nearby Cochabamba department. Indigenous groups have always had a difficult time overcoming the mountainous geography of Bolivia, as it inhibits communication between the regions and contributes to a more regional sense of community.⁴⁴ Yet the geographic challenges proved to be less significant than the literature suggests. For cocaleros originating out of one central region (the Chapare), there was little need to look beyond their own region to unite coca growers. The geography problem is more important for Peru, where the coca growing regions are further divided. Geography is one factor in explaining the level of cocalero mobilization, but it is only a partial hypothesis. I use literature on social movements in Peru and Bolivia to show that geographic challenges can be overcome to form a national movement, but they are still an impediment to constructing a shared identity.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Gootenberg, *Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug*, 214.

⁴⁴ Kohl and Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia*, 36.

F. METHODS AND SOURCES

Primary and secondary sources were used for this study. Across time, the thesis begins in 1978 coinciding with some of the first cocalero mobilizations at the local level, and ends at the present. Using the comparative case study method, I analyze cocaleros as a social movement looking specifically at framing and political opportunity structures. As I found evidence about the types of frames cocaleros used over time, I analyzed whether or not they inhibited the formation of political alliances. From there, I infer that the approach of the cocalero movement either enabled a scale shift or not.

G. THESIS OVERVIEW

Chapter II starts with the case of Peru, analyzing cocalero movements across time from the transition to democracy until the end of the Fujimori regime. This analysis shows that Peru's cocaleros tried to mobilize under closed political opportunity space with no results. Chapter III analyzes the Bolivian cocalero movement in the same manner, showing that political alliances can lead to a scale shift, when they are pursued within open political opportunity space. The fourth chapter compares the approach taken by Evo Morales's MAS party in building broad based alliances with Peru's cocalero attempts at modeling their movement after the MAS to achieve similar results (i.e., a national movement). The conclusion addresses the scores used to evaluate the cocalero movements and goes into a further discussion about the use of radical and pragmatic frames. Lastly, though the focus of this thesis is on cocalero movements, the issues of coca eradication and alternative development combined with the findings of this thesis present interesting considerations for U.S. policymakers.

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II. PERU'S COCALEROS: FRAMED AS DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND PART OF SHINING PATH

Cocalero movements in Peru and Bolivia took drastically different trajectories during the 1980s and 1990s. While movements in both countries had similar beginnings as weak and fractured, Bolivia's cocaleros were able to gain national recognition quickly through participation in an array of political alliances and later in protesting government eradication policies. In sharp contrast, Peru's cocaleros were able to muster some significant protests early on, but as the Shining Path established its stronghold over the Upper Huallaga Valley, the coca growers found themselves trapped in a violent and repressive conflict between the state and the insurgents. Coca growers elsewhere in Peru formed regional organizations, but a lack of domestic opportunity prevented them from uniting. Since Peru and Bolivia are most similar cases due to their majority indigenous populations, involvement in the Andean cocaine trade, and transition to democracy in the early 1980s, it is worthwhile examining why social movements in the two countries had such different experiences under democracy. In this chapter, the focus is explaining the failure of Peruvian cocaleros to form a national social movement in the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter three will examine the Bolivian case.

Since the United States began a worldwide war on drugs in the early 1970s, Peru has often found itself in the middle of the Andean trade in cocaine, supplying as much as 60 percent of the coca leaves necessary to satisfy the world's cocaine demand.⁴⁵ The presence of a lucrative illicit market through the 1980s and 1990s attracted peasants, drug traffickers, and even Maoist guerrillas to Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, creating a complex security problem for the state. As the United States pressured Peru to eradicate its coca plants in a supply-side strategy, the coca-growing peasants found themselves caught in a dilemma — one in which they made alliance decisions based on an economic logic. Over time, cocaleros in Peru found themselves alternatively repressed either by the government eradication forces, or Sendero Luminoso. While the peasants attempted to

⁴⁵ Coletta A Youngers and Eileen Rosin, *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: the Impact of U.S. Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2005), 188.

organize into a social movement to defend their interests in growing the coca plant, they encountered great difficulties at garnering broad-based support for their grievances.

Peru's cocaine production chain shared similar characteristics with the other Andean coca producing countries as the coca growers only performed the basic tasks of cultivation and sometimes conversion into paste, while the *mestizos* did the more profitable work of refinement.⁴⁶ The next step involved transnational actors who trafficked the drugs to their final destinations but rarely, if ever, had contact with the coca growers themselves. With clearly defined roles for each step of the production chain, it is expected that the state might differentiate between the drug traffickers, processors, and coca growers. However, this has not been the case in Peru. The cocaleros of Peru attempted to organize into a social movement to protest forced eradication of their coca fields and suppression of their organization and mobilization throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The primary goal of the cocaleros was to convince the state to spend more on social programs in the rural areas, but eventually expanded to include broader issues of "ongoing police corruption, a failing government policy, a weak anti-drug institution and misappropriation of funds destined for alternative development projects."⁴⁷ The eventual outcome of Peru's cocaleros at the end of the 1990s was a slew of regional cocalero movements, unable to mobilize nationally or realize their goals.

The coca growers of Peru have been termed a social movement, but one that has had limited success and only regional influence. In this chapter, I argue that Peru's coca growing peasants were unable to scale shift the level of their movement past the regional level in the 1980s and 1990s because of unsuccessful framing and a lack of political opportunity space throughout the period. This dynamic contrasts sharply with the successful framing of Bolivia's cocalero movement as an indigenous one and later the building of a political party. I then discuss why decentralization measures did not aid Peru's cocaleros in expanding their networks or gaining political power as might be expected.

⁴⁶ Francisco Thoumi, *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 129.

⁴⁷ Mirella Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru* (Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers, 2009).

A. INITIAL ATTEMPTS TO FORM A COCALERO MOVEMENT

Prior to the 1980s while Peru was still under military rule, we see the formation of the cocaleros as a social movement, though a weak one at inception. With assistance from the United States, the government of Peru began military operations to forcibly eradicate coca. Named *Verde Mar I* and *Verde Mar II*, these operations commenced in 1979, scattering coca growers and drug traffickers alike. At the time, coca was the most profitable crop, comprising 95 percent of economic activity in the Upper Huallaga Valley. In response to the military incursion, the cocaleros established their first formal organization, the *Comité Regional de Productores de Coca de la Provincia de Leoncio Prado y Anexo*.⁴⁸ It is important to note that this nascent organization began outside the traditional cultivation areas such as La Convención or Lares. The cocaleros of Tingo María (considered the gateway to the coca growing areas of the UHV) soon mobilized en masse to block roads and obstruct public transportation and were met with high state repression at the hands of the military and police. While their efforts may have contributed to the eventual transition of democracy in Peru, the cocaleros themselves did not succeed in their own goals to reduce state repression and permit the legal sale of coca. The nonviolent measures of roadblocks and obstruction attracted the attention of the national press, but the media framed the cocalero movement as one that merely supported the interests of drug traffickers, completely ignoring the social and economic grievances. In an obvious attempt to marginalize the cocaleros, the state used frames such as “guerrilleros,” “drug traffickers,” “uncivilized people who lived outside the law,” and “bad citizens” to describe them.⁴⁹

1. Framing and Violence in Protest

When the protests became violent, the government placed the coca-growing departments of Huánuco, San Martín and Ucayali under a state of emergency, giving the

⁴⁸ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs* (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2009), 37.

⁴⁹ Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 191.

military full control over law enforcement.⁵⁰ The cocaleros of Peru, while organized, were immediately placed on the defensive because of the drug trafficking frame. In the words of one cocalero:

I don't want people to see us as criminals, as bad people. If they visited my modest house, they would see that we are poor, honest *campesinos*. We aren't the drug traffickers or the terrorists of Peru! [...]Our slogan is: 'An honest Peruvian like you couldn't possibly be a drug trafficker or a terrorist.'⁵¹

It mattered little that few, if any of the coca growers actually ever met a trafficker. Because the cultivation of the coca plant was the first step in a long chain of the illicit cocaine trade, the frame did not have to be accurate—it only had to resonate with the intended audience. In this case, the cocaleros could not make their frames resonate with the Peruvian people and the state's frames dominated. The only concrete result of their initial protests was the militarization of the UHV.

At the end of their first wave of protests, the cocaleros were unable to exact any concessions from the military government, even though they did enter talks with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Agriculture.⁵² Thousands of cocaleros continued to protest in March 1980 in Tingo María despite continued state repression by the military. The protesters had interpreted the state's actions as a “war against the cocaleros”⁵³ and organized tens of thousands of peasants into armed *Frentes de Defensa* to negotiate with the central government and protect against abuse by the rural police units.⁵⁴ One successful frame the cocaleros used to mobilize in this period was the slogan, “Better to die on your feet than to live on your knees.”⁵⁵ After 11 days of protest, the authoritarian Morales Bermúdez government granted concessions to the cocaleros, promising them a legal outlet for the sale of coca through the National Coca Enterprise

⁵⁰ Ibid., 199.

⁵¹ Ibid., 191.

⁵² Ibid. 199.

⁵³ Ibid., 199.

⁵⁴ Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, 40.

⁵⁵ Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 199.

(ENACO), a legal market established in 1978 to commercialize and industrialize coca for legal purposes such as pharmaceuticals and Coca-Cola extract.⁵⁶

2. Cocalero Problems with Identity

As previously discussed, framing a movement in terms that mobilizes a broader section of the general population is key to success for any group with a social grievance, and is especially so for the cocaleros. Bolivia's cocaleros successfully framed their movement as an indigenous one as early as the 1980s, utilizing previously established political alliances to further their goals. However, in the case of Peru, coca growers did not so much organize along indigenous lines, but rather were forced to form their identity around class as a result of the Marxist doctrines held by *Sendero Luminoso*.⁵⁷ Moreover, Peru's cocaleros had little incentive to frame their movement as an indigenous one in the 1980s and 1990s. Since most coca growers in Peru came from an indigenous background, they shared common feelings of social exclusion as well as abandonment by the state and a deep sense of injustice. Yet they had great difficulty constructing a shared identity due to several factors: Coca growers came from different ethnicities and backgrounds, but most importantly, they were geographically divided over 10 departments encompassing 14 regions. Additionally, the frames of violence attributed to the coca growing regions and the cocaleros dependence on the illegal cocaine industry during the 1980s severely inhibited the political ascent of the cocaleros as Peru consolidated its democracy.⁵⁸

B. LACK OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONAL SPACE

1. International Pressures

While frames are an integral part of mustering support and enabling the scale shift of a social movement, political opportunities usually dictate when and if a movement

⁵⁶ Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, 39.

⁵⁷ Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*, 224.

⁵⁸ Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 197.

decides to protest. In Peru during the 1980s, there were very few domestic or international political opportunities for cocaleros. International pressure, especially the financial pressure exerted by the United States played a large role in keeping opportunities low for Peru's cocaleros. The newly democratic government of Fernando Belaúnde was especially susceptible to the carrot and stick approach of foreign governments and international institutions. Paul Gootenberg writes that Peru's coca growers in the 1980s and beyond were much less susceptible to the external pressures than the previous controllers of the coca market, the landed elites.⁵⁹ In other words, threats against cocaleros that originated from foreign powers had little effect on behavior. The U.S. in particular had other ways to exert its influence on the coca-cocaine issue. Between certification legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1986 and the direct funding of military and police operations, the U.S. maintained significant leverage over the Belaúnde government. The certification process served to ensure that the coca-producing countries were in full compliance with U.S. anti-drug policies. If a country was not up to U.S. standards, it faced the withdrawal of all economic assistance, denial of loans from international financial institutions (IFIs), and the removal of trade preferences.⁶⁰ One of the ways the U.S. was able to ensure international support for their certification policy was by referencing a United Nations agreement signed by the Andean countries stating that they would eliminate the growth of coca within their borders and even coca chewing within 25 years.⁶¹ While Peru's government did sign the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961, the actions it took to combat drug trafficking and coca cultivation between that time and the 1980s was minimal and ineffective. When the U.S. began directly funding military and police operations in coca cultivation areas, it was accompanied with a threat to retract aid, thus eliciting repressive state action against cocaleros. The international pressure worked quite effectively as the state responded and subsequently denied cocaleros domestic opportunity.

⁵⁹ Gootenberg, *Andean Cocaine: the Making of a Global Drug*, 319.

⁶⁰ Youngers and Rosin, *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: the Impact of U.S. Policy*, 284–287.

⁶¹ United Nations, "Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961" (April 1, 2005): 1–44.

2. Shining Path Coercion and National Antinarcotics Policy

Peru's transition to democracy in 1980 seemingly provided a domestic opportunity for cocaleros to be seen as valid interlocutors with the government, but this was not the case. As Peru was the main source country for cocaine in the 1980s, the U.S. administration under President Ronald Reagan focused efforts and convinced Peru's first democratically elected president since military rule, Fernando Belaúnde, to begin two special projects to combat the supply side of cocaine. One such project was CORAH, and contained the forcible action arm of the two projects. The other project, PEAH, was meant to complement CORAH by finding suitable crops to replace eradicated coca.⁶² CORAH's eradication mission used exclusively manual means to eradicate the coca bush, therefore requiring significant manpower and direct contact with coca growers. The U.S. financed a rural law enforcement agency (UMOPAR) to oversee the implementation of CORAH's mission, though President Alan García (1985-1990) dismantled the organization before the end of the 1980s due to corruption and ineffectiveness.⁶³ Because of the international pressure that manifested in the creation of CORAH and UMOPAR, Peru's transition to democracy did not yield a domestic opportunity for cocaleros.

Despite few domestic opportunities, cocaleros protested in 1982 when President Belaúnde again prohibited the cocaleros of the UHV from selling their leaves to ENACO. Thousands of cocaleros marched to Tingo María to protest their exclusion from the legal trade. The government made concessions to the protesters after 11 days. Through passage of Law 23505, ENACO activities could be resumed in the UHV, but no new cocaleros could register their crops. Mirela Van Dun writes that while these concessions were made into law, "[The law] also entailed that the registration of 1978 would be binding and no new inscriptions would be allowed. As a consequence, the majority of cocaleros in the Upper Huallaga remained illegal cultivators."⁶⁴

⁶² Dreyfus, "When All the Evils Come Together: Cocaine, Corruption, and Shining Path in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, 1980 to 1995," 377.

⁶³ Ibid., 377.

⁶⁴ Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 199.

Inhibiting cocaleros from a further scale shift were the radical leftist groups that suppressed all rival organization in the rural coca producing areas. The insurgent violence from *Sendero Luminoso* and subsequent state repression without a doubt impeded the ascent of cocaleros as a social movement through the 1980s and into the 1990s. This occurred in sharp contrast to Bolivia's cocaleros, who peacefully unionized.⁶⁵ Peru's experience in the 1980s sharply contrasts with that of Bolivia in that there were "no strongly organized confederations of coca grower trade unions in Peru...capable of defending the interests of the UHV peasants against the coca eradication campaigns of the government."⁶⁶ This lack of representation allowed the Shining Path guerrillas to occupy the gap that might have been filled by trade unions.

As mentioned previously, cocaleros could not frame their movement as indigenous because they were forced by *Sendero* to adopt a Marxist class identity as peasants. Deborah Yashar argues that while the previous decades in Peru failed to manifest networks for indigenous or ethnic mobilization, "the subsequent civil war actually destroyed networks and closed off political associational space."⁶⁷ With few allies, the cocaleros had nowhere to turn but into the repressive embrace of *Sendero*.

The guerrillas of *Sendero Luminoso* arrived in the UHV in the late 1970s to early 1980s, using the original cocalero protests to incite violence against the government. The absence of state presence in this remote area of Peru led to high levels of coca cultivation and rapidly became a haven for the Maoist *Sendero Luminoso* guerrillas as well as their rival Túpac Amaru army, leaving those involved in cocalero politics to be later referred to as "invisible actors."⁶⁸ As the Belaúnde administration pressed forward into eradication of the coca fields, the cocaleros found themselves caught between the CORAH/UMOPAR teams and the Shining Path insurgents.

⁶⁵ Gootenberg, *Andean Cocaine: the Making of a Global Drug*, 313.

⁶⁶ Dreyfus, "When All the Evils Come Together: Cocaine, Corruption, and Shining Path in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, 1980 to 1995," 381.

⁶⁷ Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*, 246.

⁶⁸ Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 197.

The guerillas of *Sendero* imposed a strict moral code that “atomized, alienated, and harassed”⁶⁹ cocaleros, giving them reason to ally with the military forces sent to protect coca eradication teams. Moreover, this blending of the two groups made it difficult for the coca growers to frame in any way that would attract other sectors of society. A particularly effective yet gruesome tactic used by *Sendero* involved eliminating any organizational leadership, even if the two groups shared similar goals.⁷⁰ In Peru, there was only room for *Sendero*. Deborah Yashar writes that *Sendero* “destroyed potential frameworks for legal organizing along ethnic lines—destroying the communication links for sharing experiences, for the rise in alternative leaders, and for the maintenance of organizations working on related issues.”⁷¹ *Sendero* quickly recognized the coca-cocaine trade could be useful source of funding for their insurgency, and assumed an exclusive role between the coca growers and the drug traffickers. Cocaleros initially welcomed *Sendero*’s protection from the CORAH and UMOPAR eradication teams, but other exacting measures took their toll. A revolutionary tax was imposed on cocaleros, forcing them to surrender a fifth of their coca crop. Additionally, *Sendero* imposed strict moral rules intended to stem a wave of crime associated with the recent colonizers of the UHV. Under the code, “Shining Path instituted punishments and penalties for those deemed undesirable, such as *fumones*; homosexuals; thieves; women suspected of sexual relations with police or the military; *traqueteros* who deceived cocaleros; and adulterers.”⁷² The cocaleros initially welcomed this form of social cleansing, but *Sendero*’s paranoia over enemy informers led them to use summary executions over the slightest accusation—a practice that was easily abused and subsequently alienated the population.⁷³

⁶⁹ Gootenberg, *Andean Cocaine: the Making of a Global Drug*, 313.

⁷⁰ Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 200.

⁷¹ Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*, 247.

⁷² Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 149.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 150.

When the government finally realized in 1984 that the eradication efforts in the UHV were unsuccessful due to continued attacks from the Shining Path, it placed the area in charge of the Peruvian Army under General Julio Carbajal. The new strategy taken by the general involved driving a wedge between the peasants and the Shining Path. He confined UMOPAR to their barracks and allowed the CORAH eradication teams to be massacred by the insurgents and drug traffickers. When the cocaleros realized they had an opening to side with either the army (who would not eradicate their crops) or the Shining Path (who taxed them and imposed a harsh moral code), the peasants chose the army.⁷⁴ The military was eventually pulled out of the UHV in 1985 when Alan García became president even though the civil war continued with cocaleros caught in the middle.

A possible domestic opportunity presented itself in the early 1990s when President Alberto Fujimori was elected President of Peru. At first, Fujimori took a drastically different approach to drug control under what is called the Fujimori Doctrine. Fujimori did not consider the coca growers to be equally nefarious as the rest of the drug traffickers in his country and instead wanted to promote economic development and open access to legal markets. In April of 1991, a new penal code removed the coca growers from the criminal chain of drug trafficking. Additionally contributing to a political opening, forced eradication had ceased in the UHV by 1989, contributing to a decline in cocalero support for *Sendero*.⁷⁵ While this important combination of openings could have contributed to the stronger organization of cocaleros, other factors discouraged them from doing so in this period. First, coca prices were in decline as a result of increased interdiction of drug traffickers. Lower demand meant suppressed wages. Second, a fungus destroyed coca bushes along the Huallaga River. With the economic benefit of growing the coca plant in the UHV diminished, coca growers migrated to other regions, especially in the departments of Cusco and Apurímac. Spread over hundreds of miles of

⁷⁴ Dreyfus, "When All the Evils Come Together: Cocaine, Corruption, and Shining Path in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, 1980 to 1995," 382–383.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 386.

forbidding terrain, the migrating cocaleros of Peru created a new barrier to organization.⁷⁶

After the failures of cocalero organization in the 1980s, various attempts to organize a national or international cocalero movement emerged. In March of 1991, Peru's coca growers helped organize an international cocalero movement, *Consejo Andino de Productores de Hoja de Coca* (CAPHC). However, the movement gained little support from the largest coca-producing areas in Peru due to the violent conflict between the state and *Sendero*. CAPHC gained the most support from Peru's cocaleros in the department of Cusco, as *Sendero* had a minimal presence there. One of Peru's own coca leaders, Hugo Cabieses, was poised to assume leadership of the international cocalero movement in 1998, but he declined to succeed Evo Morales leading to the demise of the organization that same year.⁷⁷ In this case, a domestic and international opportunity was available, yet Peru's cocaleros were neither organized on a national level nor capitalize on the existing networks.

At the end of the state's struggle with *Sendero* in the 1990s, many regional cocalero movements emerged, but the national level movement could not unite them. In February of 1998, a group of cocalero leaders organized *Coordinadora Nacional de Productores Agrícolas* (CONAPA), which was a national movement intended to unite the regional federations. There were four regional organizations that participated in CONAPA, all from the coca-producing regions of Peru. From Cusco, cocaleros organized as the *Federación Provincial de Campesinos de la Convención, Yanatile y Lares* (FEPCACYL) joined CONAPA; from the Apurímac-Ene Valley, the *Federación de Productores Agropecuarios del Valle del Río Apurímac y Ene* (FEPAVRAE); from the UHV, the *Asociación de Agricultores y Productores de Hoja de Coca del Alto Huallaga, Monzón y Padre Abad* (AAPHC-AHMPA); and lastly, from the Puno department, the *Asociación de Productores y Agricultores de Hoja de Coca de la Selva de Puno*

⁷⁶ Ibid. 387.

⁷⁷ Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 201.

(APCOCAS).⁷⁸ Despite organizing nationally, the cocaleros were unable to forge a political alliance with the *Movimiento Campesino Nacional* that would have signaled a scale shift in their movement to the national level.

C. INABILITY TO SCALE UP FOLLOWING DECENTRALIZATION

A final factor not addressed thus far that is crucial when considering the formation of cocalero movements and, more generally, the ability of a social movement to scale shift, is the question of decentralization. As we will see for the case of Bolivia in the 1990s, decentralization can very effectively pave the way for the bottom-up formation of a strong cocalero movement. However, Peru in the 1980s and 1990s shows us the limits of decentralization as a causal factor. In particular, in the Peruvian case, we see decentralization efforts in the 1980s provided political opportunities, but cocaleros were ill prepared to capitalize on those opportunities. In the 1990s, a recentralization of power under President Fujimori gave him the ability to co-opt sectors of society, keeping social movements such as the cocaleros from forging political alliances or mobilizing in any significant way.

In 1980, Peru's new constitution enacted sweeping decentralization measures designed to allow the popular election of mayors and fiscal transfers to local governments. This was done under the Belaúnde administration when the leftist party American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) dominated the constitutional assembly.⁷⁹ While this measure in theory could have provided Peru's cocaleros an opportunity to gain influence at least on a local level, *Sendero Luminoso*'s strict policy of not allowing any rival organization prohibited them from taking advantage of a political opening.

Peru's next decentralization measure did not come until 1989, when the direct election of regional governors was approved. President Alan García's APRA party lacked national level support and had a poor showing in the 1989 municipal contests.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 201.

⁷⁹ Kathleen O'Neill, *Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 54.

This measure did not create an opportunity for cocaleros, but instead was a last resort measure by García to secure high-level positions for the members of his party. Furthermore, automatic transfers of fiscal resources did not accompany this decentralization measure, something that was included in 1980. The election of Alberto Fujimori to the presidency in 1990 under his own *Cambio 90* party without a doubt signaled the breakdown of traditional parties in Peru.⁸⁰ In Bolivia, this dynamic favored the formation of a cocalero-based party, but in Peru, cocaleros were not organized enough to capitalize on this opportunity.

Following Fujimori's self-coup in 1992, a constitutional referendum was confirmed by a slim margin in 1993 that recentralized power in the executive branch. In postponed municipal elections that same year, Fujimori's party won a mere three percent of the vote, forcing him to realize that he retained little support at the local level. Fujimori soon took away the ability for opposition candidates to organize at the municipal level through several measures. First, he lowered the number of signatures candidates would be required to gather, leading to a situation where a surprising thirty-eight candidates ran for the office of mayor in one municipality.⁸¹ Second, Fujimori abolished the automatic financial transfers to the municipal governments. This allowed him to deal with groups like the cocaleros in a scheme of clientelism, which some have termed "neopopulism," since he implemented neoliberal market policies while appealing to the masses.⁸²

D. CONCLUSION

In summary, Peru's coca growers lacked domestic opportunities to scale shift the level of their movement, and were unsuccessful at conveying a frame favorable to their organization in the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, the state both repressed cocalero organization and framed them as drug traffickers, while the Shining Path guerrillas simultaneously imposed a revolutionary tax and strict moral code in the Upper Huallaga

⁸⁰ Ibid., 198–200.

⁸¹ Ibid., 201.

⁸² Raul L Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012), 132.

Valley. Eventually, the cocaleros sided with the army under General Carvajal, but the civil war continued and destroyed any chance for cocaleros to make political alliances. U.S. pressure for a supply-side drug control strategy throughout the 1980s and 1990s played a key role in keeping domestic opportunities low for cocaleros. When Alberto Fujimori became President, his neopopulist appeals created a political opening for cocalero organization as the Fujimori doctrine viewed coca growers as valid interlocutors. Even when it seemed like Peru's cocaleros were ready to scale shift their movement, the leadership did not manifest itself and the coca growers remained fractionalized.

While Peru's early democratic governments enacted decentralization measures, they were a non-factor for the cocaleros. Organizationally, the cocaleros were too repressed to take advantage of the two measures in the 1980s. In the 1990s, instead of decentralizing political power down to the municipality level, Fujimori recentralized the system and was able to co-opt cocalero leaders throughout the 1990s.

III. BOLIVIA'S COCALEROS: FRAMING AND OPPORTUNITIES

Bolivia's coca growers traditionally have chewed coca leaves to suppress the appetite and fight off altitude sickness. The practice that continues in the present is very much a part of their indigenous identity.⁸³ Yet in recent decades, the increasing world demand for cocaine has overshadowed this tradition. Kevin Healy estimates that during cocaine's peak years, some 500,000–1,000,000 Bolivian inhabitants from the social groups of peasants and farmers derived their income from coca production, trade, and trafficking activities.⁸⁴ While the peasants or *campesinos* traditionally filled the role of coca cultivation, the whites and mestizos from the richer parts of Bolivia undertook the other steps in the cocaine production chain.⁸⁵ The next step involved transnational actors who trafficked the drugs to their final destinations but rarely, if ever, had contact with the coca growers themselves. At different times throughout Bolivia's history, coca growers have also entered the coca-paste market, usually due to a drop in coca prices because of government repression.⁸⁶ Indeed, government repression has played a large role in the formation of Bolivia's cocalero movement, especially during the 1980s and 1990s.

The following analysis of the Bolivian cocalero movement will first examine the hypotheses of international and national pressure, arguing that frames using indigenous and peasant discourse made it possible for Bolivia's cocaleros to forge political alliances through the 1980s and 1990s. These mobilizing frames allowed the cocaleros to scale shift the level of their movement from a regionally based one in the Yungas and Chapare to the formation of a National movement. Second, I examine the hypothesis that favorable geography enabled a scale shift for the cocaleros movement in Bolivia since their strength of their movement originated in one central location, the Chapare. Lastly, I

⁸³ Deborah Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 185.

⁸⁴ Kevin Healy, "Coca, the State, and the Peasantry in Bolivia, 1982-1988," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 30, no. 2 (1988): 106.

⁸⁵ Francisco Thoumi, *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 129.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 117.

will discuss decentralization as a factor that contributed to the formation of a national political party based on coca related grievances, but ultimately rule it out as a causal factor for a scale shift.

A. SUCCESSFUL FRAMING AS INDIGENOUS AND PEASANTS

On the international level, decades-old agreements began to take effect in the 1980s prompting the newly democratic government of Bolivia to address the coca issue. The United Nations had definitively pronounced coca an illicit substance in 1961 as part of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. As party to the convention, the governments of both Peru and Bolivia agreed to eliminate coca cultivation within 20 years, and the traditional practice of coca chewing within 25 years.⁸⁷ Then, in 1986, the U.S. began a certification process to ensure that drug-producing countries were in full compliance with U.S. anti-drug policies. If a country was not up to U.S. standards, it faced the withdrawal of all economic assistance, denial of loans from IFIs, and the removal of trade preferences.⁸⁸ The recently transitioned democratic government of Siles Zuazo (1982-1985) faced mounting inflation and other financial woes, problems that would most certainly be exacerbated with a removal of foreign aid. Compounding the problem, the utter lack of measures enacted by the previous military governments and tacit endorsement of the illegal drug trade led to a flourishing of illicit cocaine markets. Though coca growers denied involvement in cocaine production, they became the primary targets for U.S. anti-drug policy vis à vis the Bolivian government.⁸⁹ The U.S. either directly funded military and police operations in coca cultivation areas, or they threatened the government of Bolivia with a retraction of aid, eliciting repressive action against cocaleros. The U.S. also attempted to frame Bolivia's cocaleros as drug

⁸⁷ United Nations, "Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961" (April 1, 2005): 23.

⁸⁸ Coletta A Youngers and Eileen Rosin, *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: the Impact of U.S. Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 284–287.

⁸⁹ Jose Antonio Lucero, *Struggles of Voice* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 89; Youngers and Rosin, *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: the Impact of U.S. Policy*, 143.

traffickers, as it was successfully done in Peru. Such a mischaracterization by the U.S. failed to resonate with some of Bolivia's leaders, though others have adopted it wholeheartedly.

The first democratically elected president of Bolivia since the transition, Hernán Siles Zuazo, initially viewed cocaleros as a central part of his Unidad Democrática y Popular (UPD) party's center-left constituency that brought an end to military rule in Bolivia (1964-82). However, Siles later decreed 4,000 hectares of coca be eradicated by 1985 to stop the U.S. from withdrawing financial aid.⁹⁰ While this angered cocaleros in the early 1980s, the action that incited them to mobilize had more to do with the marketing strategy to control coca. Before Siles took office, the military government had set up a network of wholesale distribution centers to control the coca leaf. The measures were unpopular with the coca-growing peasants because of the low prices and corruption in the way they were run. When Siles attempted to increase the role of the state in the wholesale marketing and international distribution of coca, peasant union activists occupied the wholesale facilities in the Chapare and destroyed them.⁹¹

Faced with a loss of their rights to grow and market coca, cocaleros in the Chapare began seeking out alliances with the peasant union organizations in the upper Cochabamba Valley and later the most important national peasant union in Bolivia. Before long the Chapare cocaleros had influence in the highest level of Bolivia's all-encompassing labor union the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB). The cocalero movement in Bolivia then made impressive gains in through the 1980s as they expanded their political power within the networks of peasant and labor *sindicatos* (unions). However, Bolivian cocaleros did not succeed in gaining many seats in the national parliament during this decade. Their initial success can primarily be attributed to successful framing as indigenous and peasants.

Cocaleros in the 1980s were most often thought of among the urban elite and the mestizo population as indigenous peasant farmers, in part due to their imitation of some

⁹⁰ Healy, "Coca, the State, and the Peasantry in Bolivia, 1982-1988," 111.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 112.

of the previously successful social movements. The most prominent Bolivian social movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the Kataristas, were the entrepreneurs of the indigenous frame. These individuals successfully organized along indigenous lines during periods of military rule and eventually attained leadership positions in the peasant unions. Katarista leaders were at the forefront of the unified peasant confederation named the Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB). The federation was successful in bringing ethnic demands into policy debates, though most of their proposals for communal property rights and political autonomy were never voted on in the national Congress.⁹² Building on the success of the Kataristas, the cocaleros adopted the indigenous discourse in the 1980s as a tool for organizing. The reason for adopting the indigenous frame had a lot to do with political opportunity. Domestically, the Kataristas had secured extensive networks in the urban spaces, while the peasant-based movements worked to secure the rural areas.⁹³ By adopting the indigenous frame, cocaleros hoped to make alliances in the urban sectors, and by adopting the peasant frame, the rural organizations. Gaining influence within the Katarista-founded CSUTCB was made easier across disparate geography as the Chapare cocaleros reached out to the peasant federations in the two other coca-growing regions: the Yungas provinces (in the department of La Paz) and the Yapacane area (in the department of Santa Cruz).

The Chapare cocaleros, mostly migrant farmers and displaced miners, were especially important in framing the movement. The former tin miners in particular possessed a large repertoire for collective action; the skills were learned during protests under repressive military rule.⁹⁴

There is little doubt that the Chapare coca growers, organized as the Federación Especial de Trabajadores Campesinos del Trópico de Cochabamba (FETCTC), were the

⁹² Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*, 180–181.

⁹³ Ibid., 154–155.

⁹⁴ S. Sándor John, *Bolivia's Radical Tradition* (Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 2009); Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*, 185.

single most influential member of the CSUTCB in the 1980s. The FETCTC was able to establish the *Comisión de Coca* as a permanent working committee in the CSUTCB congress, which brought the coca leaf to its position as a leading concern in all discussion.⁹⁵ Healy writes that in the mid to late 1980s, the coca producer federations surpassed the labor militancy of even the Bolivian mine workers.⁹⁶ Under authoritarian military rule in Bolivia from the 1970s to 1982, tin miners were the primary activists that participated in protests and ultimately forced the transition to democracy.⁹⁷

Though frames of indigenous and peasant plight did not resonate with the mestizos and whites, cocaleros did find numerous partners to grow their movement throughout the decade. The Chapare federations were able to leverage not only the CSUTCB peasant delegations in the region, but their political allies as well.⁹⁸ The movement began to grow in strength as cocaleros replicated the success of the Kataristas in framing their movement as an indigenous one.⁹⁹ By organizing as an indigenous group, the cocaleros were able to attract attention from other indigenous groups that welcomed them in a political alliance. Especially in the coca-chewing (as opposed to coca producing) regions of Chuquisaca, Potosí and Oruro, the common indigenous and cultural connection was vitally important. As part of the national CSUTCB congress, peasants representatives from those regions would carry back messages concerning the threat to the “sacred leaf” which further strengthened solidarity for the cocaleros.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Kevin Healy, “Political Ascent of Bolivia’s Peasant Coca Leaf Producers,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 33, no. 1 (April 1, 1991): 93.

⁹⁶ Healy, “Coca, the State, and the Peasantry in Bolivia, 1982-1988,” 109.

⁹⁷ “Bolivian Tin Miners Campaign for Economic Justice and Human Rights, 1977-1978” Global Nonviolent Action Database,” Nvdatabase.Swarthmore.Edu, <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/bolivian-tin-miners-campaign-economic-justice-and-human-rights-1977-1978>, accessed May 28, 2013.

⁹⁸ Healy, “Political Ascent of Bolivia’s Peasant Coca Leaf Producers,” 95.

⁹⁹ Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*, 186-190.

¹⁰⁰ Healy, “Political Ascent of Bolivia’s Peasant Coca Leaf Producers,” 94.

B. POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONAL SPACE

The local unions were vital to cocaleros in the 1980s for the channeling their grievances. Kevin Healy writes:

The union experience combined with external political threats also has propelled the peasantry to organize the Asociacion Nacional de Productores de Coca (ANAPCOCA) with representatives from the coca leaf growing zones of the regions of La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba.¹⁰¹

ANAPCOCA enabled the Chapare cocaleros to solidify support around the coca leaf in an organizational structure that paralleled that of the CSUTCB. However, the organization had limited power on its own; the real strength goal of the Chapare cocaleros was not merely to consolidate their support among other coca growers, but to secure their autonomy and position representatives at the highest levels of the national government. To do this, they needed the CSUTCB and their encompassing organization, the *Central Obrera Boliviana* (COB). Bank employees, teachers, peasants, miners, factory workers, trade unions, and labor of all kind fell under the purview of the COB. The activism of the Chapare coca growing federations however, was unique among all of the COB's constituents. When the role of other labor groups weakened in the 1980s as result of neoliberal economic reforms, the CSUTCB lobbied for a stronger role within the COB.¹⁰²

Domestic opportunities seemed high for cocaleros to protest leading up to 1985. Yet in 1985, the Movimiento Revolucionario Nacional (MNR), a right of center party, won back power under President Victor Paz Estensorro signaling the end of union power. His policies represent the beginning of neoliberal economic reform in Bolivia, as he privatized many state-run enterprises and began structural adjustment programs endorsed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Postero writes that the power of unions to summon popular support through protest began to wane in the wake of these reforms. However, where the power was diminishing is important. The rural

¹⁰¹ Healy, "Coca, the State, and the Peasantry in Bolivia, 1982–1988," 109.

¹⁰² Healy, "Political Ascent of Bolivia's Peasant Coca Leaf Producers."

areas did experience lower levels of support for the peasant unions, with the exception of the CSUTCB and their main force for action, the cocaleros. Postero contributes this reduction of influence to the closure of the mines and subsequent relocation of miners as a result of structural adjustment policies. The neoliberal policies that halted inflation and privatized the mines also provided a political opening for the return of democratic processes including representation, a role previously held closely by the labor unions.¹⁰³ While these policies seemingly should have ended the cocaleros' main source of organization, they merely strengthened the resolve of cocaleros and bolstered their numbers as many of the former miners became coca growers in the Chapare. Once organized in unions, the cocaleros presented a bigger target for state eradication policies. At this point the cocaleros began to adopt a strong nationalist sentiment in response to state attempts to marginalize their movement.

Nationalist rhetoric had a strong influence on the ability of Bolivian cocaleros to frame themselves in a positive manner through the 1980s and 1990s. Anti-US discourse was especially important in mutually reinforcing the doctrinal positions of the CSUTCB and the COB. The U.S. military led Operation Blast Furnace in 1986 was particularly helpful event in stirring nationalist sentiment against what many perceived as a violation of national sovereignty. Even though the operation only targeted drug processing labs and not the coca itself, the destruction of the labs disrupted the market for Bolivian coca leaves as drug traffickers fled the area. The U.S.-financed rural law enforcement agency UMOPAR (Unidad Movable de Patrullaje Rural) was also a tangible enemy that the cocaleros could use to mobilize group members.

In 1988, the *Ley de Regimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controladas*, or Law 1008, provided yet another rallying point for the Chapare cocaleros as it essentially criminalized coca cultivation outside of the Yungas. Bolivia's coca growers were subject to their first major confrontation with their government over eradication of the coca plant when Law 1008 was implemented by Víctor Paz Estenssoro in response to the U.S. Congress passing the 1985 Foreign Assistance Act "authorizing the president to decertify

¹⁰³ Nancy Grey Postero, *Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 137.

and terminate aid to any country considered out of compliance with U.S. anti-drug objectives.”¹⁰⁴ The law permitted 12,000 hectares of coca to be grown in the Yungas for traditional use—an amount supposedly sufficient for national demand.¹⁰⁵ However, in the Chapare, where thousands of laid off tin miners had migrated at the start of the decade in response to government incentives, no coca was permitted. Though the government had intended for the tin miners to switch to agriculture, it did not anticipate the challenges of both growing produce and delivering it to a market in a reasonable timeframe. Most of the migrants became primarily subsistence farmers who grew coca as their cash crop in the Chapare. The past experience of the tin miners in engaging in active protest partially explains why the Chapare coca unions were the most active and militant labor federation through the 1980s. The international pressure did provide an eventual impetus for cocalero organization, as the U.S. law prompted the Bolivian government under Paz to agree to an aggressive approach to coca eradication.

C. THE REPERTOIRE OF PROTEST: TACTICS TO GAIN SUPPORTERS

Coca leaf producers have a large repertoire of actions for public protest when threatened by government policy, actions, and laws. They include sit-ins at government facilities, hunger strikes, mass rallies, marches, and road blockades. Healy posits that the most effective form of protest in Bolivia has been the road blockade, which galvanizes hundreds of local unions. When it comes to tactics, Bolivia contrasts with Peru in that the cocaleros never have aligned with guerrilla movements, instead pursuing nonviolent pressure and defense tactics.¹⁰⁶

Road blockades were most effective tactic in the 1980s, as the Siles government responded to protest pressure from the Chapare coca growers by granting the right to market the coca leaf independent of government control. However, the government overturned the measure within six months, a result of U.S. pressure. In this case,

¹⁰⁴ Kenneth Lehman, “A ‘Medicine of Death’? U.S. Policy and Political Disarray in Bolivia, 1985-2006,” in *Addicted to Failure*, ed. Brian Loveman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006), 133.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 133.

¹⁰⁶ Healy, “Coca, the State, and the Peasantry in Bolivia, 1982-1988,” 110.

cocaleros were able to muster their support through peasant congresses across the country. The National Association of Coca Producers (ANAPCOCA) was instrumental in coordinating the blockade of major highways in the altiplano and in the lowland Santa Cruz that led to the government's accommodation.¹⁰⁷ When cocaleros saw that the road blocking tactics were more effective than violent resistance, it became the primary tactic in the repertoire for the next two decades.

D. DECENTRALIZATION AIDS THE FORMATION OF A POLITICAL PARTY

The neoliberal reforms set in place in the 1980s presented a both an opportunity and a challenge for social movements in the 1990s, one that eventually led to decentralization efforts. Literature suggests that decentralization reforms may lead to the scale shift of a movement as its actors are increasingly able to participate in a representative government and bring their grievances to the policy arena. This section shows how neoliberal reforms led to Bolivia's most important decentralization law, which in turn provided cocaleros with exposure in electoral politics and a consolidation of power in the Chapare. Because cocaleros were already utilizing the union structure, they found repeated success at municipal level elections, which eventually led to the formation of a political party. Though decentralization in the Bolivia case was not the crucial factor enabling a scale shift of the movement, it did help form the cocalero-controlled MAS party. The way in which Bolivia's cocaleros took advantage of decentralization contrasts with the Peru case, where cocaleros were unprepared and highly repressed from having power outside Sendero Luminoso's class-centered organization.

The neoliberal reforms of the 1980s stirred up long-standing conflicts between elites and indigenous peoples, and gave autonomy proponents a greater chance at securing their interests. The cocaleros found themselves in the middle of these conflicts. How were they expected to frame their movement in this decade? The class centered and ethnic discourse used by cocaleros in the 1980s worked to secure them high level

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 112.

positions within national organizations like the COB. Though influential in peasant worker organizations, little progress was made in gaining seats in Parliament or in the formation of a political party that would represent their interests. The new administration of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997), commonly known as “Goni,” attempted to streamline access to government in an attempt to ease some of the tension within the country. He designed a plan that would emphasize peasant and indigenous rights in a way that would not interfere with free market forces. During his administration, he “reinvented [Bolivia] with an all-encompassing programme that fully fleshed out the neoliberal policies introduced during the 1985 New Economic Policy (NEP).”¹⁰⁸ Goni saw the government’s role as the mediator between the international community and the Bolivian people. It was to be a critical role in the newly globalized economy composed of IFIs and private investment firms. While the 1952 revolution hoped to create a modern *mestizo* state, the plan in the 1990s was to create a multicultural state that was decentralized and postmodern.¹⁰⁹ Thus, the Bolivian constitution was revised in 1994 with goals to address “underlying and ongoing tensions in the country’s history: regional autonomy vs. centralized government, and indigenous vs. elite demands.”¹¹⁰ The most important law the Parliament passed affecting cocaleros during Goni’s administration was the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (Law 1551), which specifically named indigenous actors as participants in the local political system.¹¹¹

While the cocaleros were happy to frame their movement as indigenous and gain access to local municipal governments, this had already been accomplished by the time the LPP took effect.¹¹² Rather, the Sanchez de Lozada administration’s decentralization initiative can be seen as a “deliberate attempt by the country’s central government to fragment, localize, and pacify popular social movements.”¹¹³ Kohl and Farthing also

¹⁰⁸ Kohl and Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia*, 84.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 85–86.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 90.

¹¹¹ Postero, *Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia*, 124.

¹¹² John D Cameron, “Hacia La Alcaldía: the Municipalization of Peasant Politics in the Andes,” *Latin American Perspectives* 36, no. 4 (July 1, 2009): 74.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 76.

note that an unstated goal of the 1985 neoliberal NEP was to destroy the power of the COB and popular resistance with it.¹¹⁴ Goni realized he needed to include the indigenous in political processes to stem the waves of protest originating from the rural indigenous and peasant groups. By accepting the cocaleros' own frame as indigenous, he expected to marginalize and pacify the movement. When he ran for office in 1993, Goni made a strategic choice in picking the indigenous Aymara, Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, as his vice president. The cocaleros had already framed their struggle as an indigenous one in the prior decade. Thus, while Goni thought his reforms could address the plight of indigenous people and that they could be co-opted through decentralization, he failed to realize that the cocaleros were the center of gravity of the indigenous movement and would not be deterred so easily from pursuing their goals of legal coca markets or alternative development.

Raúl Madrid confirms that decentralization was a non-factor for cocaleros participation in municipal elections, though he does acknowledge that the Law of Popular Participation helps explain the formation of the MAS. The constitutional reforms of 1994 directly facilitated greater participation of Cocaleros in the legislature as it created "smaller single-member districts for elections to one tier of the lower chamber of the legislature."¹¹⁵ Yet Madrid rules out this explanation for the rise of the MAS, as the party would likely have earned the same number of seats in the legislature under the old system.

E. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COCA-COCAINE ISSUE ON THE BOLIVIAN ECONOMY

The defense of a regional economic base became very important for certain regional elites in Bolivia toward the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s. Hoping to expand their constituencies to include rural areas, Congressional leaders and political hopefuls made the plight of the cocaleros a centerpiece of their campaigns. One predecessor to the MAS, the Izquierda Unidad (IU) opposition political front took 44

¹¹⁴ Kohl and Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia*, 75.

¹¹⁵ Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America*, 36.

percent of the vote in the Chapare province during the 1989 presidential elections touting its platform of opposition to Bolivian and U.S. drug control policies.¹¹⁶ Correspondence from a congressional leader in the left of center Vanguardia 9 Party showed that if coca eradication were successful in the region of Cochabamba that he represented, it would require \$3 billion to recover from the impact it would have on the regional economy.¹¹⁷ The motivations for the political elite to ally with cocaleros are evidenced in this case; elites correctly saw the economy as the key to their own legitimacy and position—something that would be compromised if the peasants were not allowed to grow coca.

It would be a misrepresentation of the elite to say that alliances with cocaleros were common in Bolivia because of coca's effect on the local economies. Elites elsewhere, such as those who were part of the *Confederación de Empresarios Privados* (CEP), the Bolivian businessmen's association, opposed coca cultivation and lobbied the U.S. government for financial assistance to achieve the goal. The underlying motivation seems to be easily revealed as increases in the U.S. foreign aid budget were to be made in ways that specifically benefitted the business elites, including hard currency and financial credits that could be invested in the national economy.¹¹⁸

The coca and cocaine industry became so profitable and important to Bolivia's economy at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s that President Jaime Paz Zamora began to factor the direct and indirect costs of coca eradication into his requests for aid from the U.S. government. Bolivian planners in 1990 estimated that \$490 million per year was the necessary amount to substitute the illegal economy.¹¹⁹ An additional \$449 was deemed necessary to cover the indirect costs of the market, according to Kevin Healy. The economic data suggests that it was not so much cocalero activism that

¹¹⁶ Kevin Healy, "The Coca-Cocaine Issue in Bolivia: A Political Resource for all Seasons," in *Coca, cocaine and the Bolivian reality*, eds. Léons, Madeline Barbara, and Harry Sanabria (New York: SUNY Press, 1997).

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 236.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 236.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 238.

propelled the government to adopt this position, but rather the expansion of many peasants into the coca paste-making industry.¹²⁰

In 1995, Bolivia failed to meet coca eradication targets established earlier in Law 1008. In response, the U.S. government decertified Bolivia, endangering financial aid provided by the U.S. and other multilateral agencies. The government of Sanchez de Lozada had avoided direct confrontation with the coca growers in his attempt to keep the country's primary focus on the NEP, but a lack of foreign investment also threatened to derail his plan. By this point in Goni's administration the informal economy accounted for as much as half of all economic activity in Bolivia. Coca and cocaine were a large part of the economy, along with contraband and remittances. It appeared the NEP was working, but for as many as two-thirds of Bolivians, the only place to find work was in the informal sector, especially the coca trade.¹²¹ For Goni to keep the economy churning at its current rate, he had to depend on both the informal economy and foreign aid—a combination that soon proved to be mutually exclusive.¹²² Under duress, Goni militarized the Chapare and eradicated the minimum number of coca plants necessary to restore Bolivia's standing with the United States.

The economy is important to mention in this chapter because the importance of the coca-cocaine industry to Bolivia's economy is and was far greater than more developed and diversified countries like Peru and Colombia. Bolivia's heavy reliance on foreign financial assistance after its transition to democracy has made their governments highly susceptible to the anti-coca initiatives usually tied to any assistance. The impact on cocalero mobilization is that there is a cycle of protest, negotiation and appeasement, forced eradication, and back to protest. Bolivia's cocaleros were caught up in this cycle for much of the 1980s and 1990s. When local politicians realized the impact of the coca trade, cocaleros had opportunities to forge alliances and work toward a scale shift.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 238.

¹²¹ Kohl and Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia*, 73.

¹²² Lehman, "A 'Medicine of Death'? U.S. Policy and Political Disarray in Bolivia, 1985–2006," 135.

F. GOVERNMENT COUNTER-FRAMING AND COMMITMENT TO ERADICATION INHIBITS COCALEROS DURING THE BANZER REGIME

Plan Dignidad, or Dignity Plan, was Bolivia's most ambitious attempt to eradicate coca and defeat the cocalero movement. At the end of Goni's first term in office, former Bolivian military general and dictator Hugo Banzer won the presidential election in 1997 as part of a broad based political coalition. His election represents a sweeping shift from avoiding confrontation with cocaleros to a no-holds-barred approach to coca crop reduction. The U.S. government was becoming increasingly wary of Bolivia's commitment to reduce the supply of coca and Banzer was expected to change that. U.S. drug czar Barry McCaffrey warned Banzer that Bolivia had received \$500 million in U.S. aid while coca output increased, a situation that was no longer acceptable.¹²³ There was initial dialogue between cocaleros and the Banzer government in 1997 and both parties reached an agreement to eradicate a total of 3000 coca hectares in exchange for compensation of US\$2500 per ha., the opening of coca markets, and withdrawal of armed forces from the Chapare, among other demands.¹²⁴ The duration of the agreement only lasted two months as Banzer succumbed to U.S. pressure by announcing his Plan in 1998. The move was an unprecedented attack on coca at every level, but it especially focused on eradicating all coca deemed illegal by Law 1008. Compensation plans were phased out—meaning coca growers could no longer use the money to replant coca. Banzer claimed that coca eradication would be “voluntary when possible, but forcible when necessary.”¹²⁵ The plan laid out four pillars of action that the international community was expected to support: Alternative Development, Prevention and Rehabilitation, Eradication of Illegal and Excess Coca, and Interdiction. In reality, the only pillar fully supported was coca eradication.¹²⁶

¹²³ Ibid., 134.

¹²⁴ Allison Spedding and Hugo Cabieses, “Cocalero Movements in Peru and Bolivia,” Transnational Institute Drugs and Conflict Debate Paper 10 (2004), 8.

¹²⁵ Lehman, “A ‘Medicine of Death’? U.S. Policy and Political Disarray in Bolivia, 1985–2006,” 135.

¹²⁶ Kathryn Ledebur, “Bolivia: Clear Consequences,” in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: the Impact of U.S. Policy*, ed. Coletta A Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2005), 154.

Instead of depending on UMOPAR to carry out the eradication, Banzer created an entirely new Joint Task Force composed of military and police eradication teams. During the heyday of Plan Dignidad, there were approximately 4,500 security force members permanently stationed in the Chapare.¹²⁷ Cocaleros did not stand idly by. In October 2000, six coca grower federations came to an agreement with Banzer's government that no new bases would be created in the Chapare. Yet construction continued through 2001 with 18 combined forces camps.¹²⁸

The ability of Banzer to implement his *Plan Dignidad* relied heavily on framing the Cocaleros as “narcotraffickers,” implicit conspirators in the coca-cocaine production chain. The cocaleros became unwittingly linked to the drug traffickers in domestic and international discourse, providing a difficult obstacle to overcome—one that they would not achieve in the 1990s. Banzer's Plan was touted as the model for a successful anti-drug policy, as coca cultivation was reduced to 6000 hectares.¹²⁹

The cocaleros were unable to successfully counter-frame in the 1990s, but they did frame the entrance of military forces in the Chapare as another example of U.S. intervention inside a sovereign nation. The connection to the U.S. was easy to see: the U.S. was funding and training the military in police tactics while withholding alternative development funding until progress was made in eradication.¹³⁰

G. CONCLUSION

Bolivia's cocaleros in the 1980s and 1990s scale shifted the level of their movement from regional ones based in the Yungas and Chapare to a nationally recognized organization through successful framing as indigenous and peasants. Through political alliances with the peasant and worker unions, cocaleros were able to mobilize their supporters to establish road blocks and other nonviolent tactics in response to government eradication policies under relatively open political associational space.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 155.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Eduardo A. Gamarra, “Has Bolivia Won the War? Lessons from *Plan Dignidad*,” Latin American and Caribbean Center Department of Political Science Florida International University, April 2002.

¹³⁰ Ledebur, “Bolivia: Clear Consequences,” 156–157.

International pressures vis à vis U.S. policy would both serve as a rallying point and a source of grievances for the cocaleros through the 1980s and 1990s. The certification process meant that weaker countries like Bolivia had few options for growing their economies if they did not demonstrate compliance with U.S. anti-drug policies. Cocaleros were able to overcome many of these obstacles through opportunistic framing of their own, and the use of nonviolent tactics during protests.

In the 1990s, Goni's policies that recognized cocaleros as valid interlocutors provided a domestic political opportunity to possibly achieve a scale shift, but even Goni resorted to repressive measures and forced eradication in the end. When former General Hugo Banzer came to power, he all but declared war on cocaleros, essentially closing off political associational space. His framing of cocaleros as drug traffickers also inhibited the movement's growth into the late 1990s. Still, the cocaleros of Bolivia came out of the 1980s and 1990s much stronger than their Peruvian counterparts. Despite repression, the movement maintained the freedom to organize in unions, and the protests continued.

IV. RISE OF THE MAS AND PERU'S "BOLIVIANIZATION" THAT NEVER HAPPENED

Prior chapters gave explanations for why Peru's cocaleros were unable to scale shift their movement past the regional level while Bolivia's cocaleros were able to form a national coalition in the 1980s and 1990s. The analysis now centers on comparing Peru's cocalero movement with Bolivia's cocaleros since the rise of the MAS party in Bolivia (2002–present) coinciding with Toledo's government (2001–2006), Garcia's second government (2006–2011) and the Humala administration (2011–present). Bolivia's cocaleros, united under their left-of-center leader Evo Morales (President of Bolivia from 2006–present) and fresh off consecutive electoral wins in municipal elections, continued their rise under the MAS party. The movement not only achieved the seemingly impossible task of electing one of its own to the highest office in the land, but it also scale shifted the level of its movement to a place of national influence over all processes of the democracy. According to Frank Xavier Barrios Suvelza,

Evismo would stand out from earlier left-wing experiences precisely because it endows those social movements with 'access to levels of state decision making'—a process of change that vice president Álvaro García Linera sees as a being of global resonance.¹³¹

In this period, opportunities for organization, mobilization, and political alliances became more abundant for cocaleros due to an opening of what Yashar refers to as "political associational space."¹³² Specifically, escalated levels of popular protest against forced eradication coincided with the restoration of decentralization measures that were taken away under Fujimori. A number of mass cocalero marches on Lima seemed to signal a scale shift for the Peruvian movement. Popular protests were more common and the government suppressed them less often. Coca growing areas were steadily demilitarized and some dialogue occurred between cocaleros and government officials. While some of these opportunities arose outside cocalero control, nonviolent collective

¹³¹ John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead, *Unresolved Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 131.

¹³² Deborah Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 75–76.

action was rewarded with promises from the government. Some have even pointed to the “Bolivianization” of Peru’s cocalero movement, as they attempted to replicate some of what they perceived to be the successful mechanisms for organization and mobilization in Bolivia.¹³³ Nonetheless, a national Peruvian cocalero movement failed to coalesce.

This chapter explores the unprecedented levels of mobilization of Peru’s cocaleros and demonstrates that not only are political alliances necessary to scale shift the level of a cocalero movement, but the *correct* alliances are essential. Again, successful framing is an essential tool to secure such political alliances. When the government was able to continually frame Peruvian cocalero leaders as part of The Shining Path, cocaleros could not unite or form alliances with a broader sector of society. International pressure vis à vis the United States and domestic pressures of coca eradication also proves to be a consistent theme for mobilizing of cocaleros in both countries, but in the post-Fujimori era, the cocaleros of Peru became stagnant because of internal divisions. This occurred in stark contrast to Bolivia’s cocaleros, whose base in the Chapare operated more like a union and imposed strict penalties on anyone not willing to fully support its goals.

Additionally, this chapter analyzes the more recent decentralization laws in Peru and examines their effect on cocalero organization in Peru. Since Fujimori had effectively closed off municipal governments to popular participation, cocaleros had even less access to their government up until President Alejandro Toledo restored a decentralized system. However, unlike with the Law of Popular Participation in Bolivia, cocaleros in Peru had to vie with other social movements for control of the municipalities, and ultimately could not consolidate control. Finally, with the left-of-center MAS party quickly rising to power in Bolivia over a disenchantment with market oriented policies, this chapter argues that a Left turn does not necessarily enable a cocalero movement’s scale shift but may be an important factor.

¹³³ Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 197.

A. THE RISE OF THE MAS PARTY

By understanding the origin of the MAS Party in Bolivia, we see how important it is for the leader of a social movement to use frames, but also to have an inclusive approach that fosters political alliances that in turn bolsters the strength and influence of the movement. Prior to Evo Morales' election in 2005, cocaleros were a social movement to be reckoned with at the national level, yet few international actors shared their grievances. It took until 2013 to secure a political victory on the international level, as much of Latin America and the world supported Bolivia's petition to remove coca from the list of prohibited substances on the 1961 U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.¹³⁴ Such a victory was not won outright, but through a long process of building a political party, making the correct alliances, and framing their struggle in a way that was both credible and reinforced alliances.

The predecessor party to the MAS, the Asamblea Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP) won a mere three percent of the national vote in 1997.¹³⁵ However, over the course of the Banzer, Quiroga, and Mesa presidencies, the MAS rose to prominence as the cocaleros protested forced eradication policies and repressive state action. The characteristic missing from the cocalero approach early on was incorporation of the dissatisfied and antiestablishment urban mestizo.¹³⁶ First, the continued attempts of Hugo Banzer and his successor, Jorge Quiroga, to eradicate coca fields fueled further support for Evo Morales and the MAS party. Violent conflicts between coca growers and government eradication forces were common in Bolivia between 2000 and 2002. Coca growth in the Chapare region dwindled due to successful eradication operations while production increased in the traditional growing area of the Yungas. Even though that area was supposed to be off-limits to eradication forces, international pressure from the United States prompted the incursion of Banzer's Joint Task Force (JTF) into the region.

¹³⁴ United Nations Drug Control, "Bolivia Wins a Rightful Victory on the Coca Leaf," Undrugcontrol.Info, <http://www.undrugcontrol.info/en/newsroom/press-releases/item/4267-bolivia-wins-a-rightful-victory-on-the-coca-leaf>, accessed July 23, 2013.

¹³⁵ Raul L Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies of the Movimiento Al Socialismo," in *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*, ed. Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 241.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

The move turned out to be a serious mistake for the Banzer regime as his forces met violent resistance from coca growers, and public support for *Plan Dignidad* diminished. Following this shift, the Chapare coca growers again turned to mass marches and road blocks as forms of protest. With public opinion trending their way, the cocaleros in the Yungas used collective action to force the withdrawal of eradication forces from their area.¹³⁷

The tactics that were most useful to cocaleros in the 1980s and 1990s emerged again in the post-Banzer era, demonstrating that the movement had learned from their experiences. Yet mobilizing cocaleros in protest against eradication policies had little lasting effect on governments. It became clear that to secure their interests against foreign and domestic pressures, cocaleros had to win elections at the national level. Road blockages again turned out to be the most effective tactic at garnering national attention, but one particularly violent conflict in 2002 had the greatest effect for the rise of the MAS party in electoral politics. In January of 2002, the Quiroga government renewed the push toward the goal of “zero coca” with an uncompromising approach. Perhaps most importantly for mobilizing allies sympathetic to the coca growers’ cause, the government began to enforce its Supreme Decree 26415, which not only targeted illicit coca in the Chapare but also coca grown for previously legal markets.¹³⁸ In response, several thousand Chapare coca growers clashed with security forces in the central coca market of Sacaba leading to the death of four security officers. At this point, public opinion turned against coca growers, and further negotiations seemed impossible. More than 80 coca union leaders were detained and a majority of the lower house of Congress voted to remove Evo Morales from his congressional seat. Morales was accused of inciting the violence that led to the death of two policemen. According to Kathryn Ledebur, this move backfired, as the deliberate targeting of Morales only bolstered his support and public image.¹³⁹ In the last days of the Banzer regime in Bolivia and

¹³⁷ Kathryn Ledebur, “Bolivia: Clear Consequences,” in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: the Impact of U.S. Policy*, ed. Coletta A Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers Inc., 2005), 158-159.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 159.

throughout the presidency of Quiroga, it became clear that the government was more willing to enter talks with cocaleros, even if their promises were ultimately fruitless. This meant a domestic opportunity for cocaleros to organize and build alliances.

1. A Pragmatic and Inclusive Approach Helps the MAS Build Alliances

The MAS party began building upon its cocalero base by appealing to the ethnic identities. Unlike traditional parties, the MAS candidates were mostly indigenous. This broadened their appeal to the majority indigenous population in Bolivia. Perhaps more importantly, the MAS embraced the indigenous platform of land reform, autonomy, and recognition of the local indigenous justice systems. The MAS fully embraced the indigenous frame by wearing the clothing, speaking in indigenous languages, and using traditional symbols (including coca) in the campaign.¹⁴⁰ The candidates and the platform managed to appear genuinely indigenous as the MAS claimed to be the sole legitimate representative of indigenous people in Bolivia.

It was not long before the U.S. interests in Bolivia were more evident in the electoral scene. Evo Morales's expulsion from Congress put him and his message of indigenous inclusion at the forefront of politics. This seemingly unfortunate event did more for the cocalero movement than anyone expected. Adding to the hype surround Morales, the U.S. Ambassador, Manuel Rocha, warned Bolivians four days before the 2002 national election that U.S. aid would end if Morales were elected.¹⁴¹ The MAS party lost the presidential election in June 2002 by only 1.5 percent to Sánchez de Lozada. However, it fared better than the incumbent's party, the Acción Democrática Nacional (ADN), which took a mere 3.4 percent of the total vote.¹⁴² Despite its success, the MAS failed to capture a broader sector of society outside of its core supporters. The failure to use a more inclusive approach left Bolivia susceptible to foreign influence. The election of Sanchez de Lozada with his precarious coalition between the MNR and Paz Zamora's Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) party was described as a

¹⁴⁰ Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies of the Movimiento Al Socialismo," 244.

¹⁴¹ Ledebur, "Bolivia: Clear Consequences," 160.

¹⁴² Donna Lee Van Cott, "From Exclusion to Inclusion: Bolivia's 2002 Elections," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35, no. 4 (November 1, 2003): 753.

“shotgun wedding crafted mainly by US ambassador Manuel Rocha.”¹⁴³ Evo Morales had neglected to reach across the aisle to ally with any of the other political parties and it likely cost him the election. Additionally, he had not yet attempted to include larger sectors of civil society like the whites and mestizos in his party.¹⁴⁴ The next election proved to be very different, as the MAS quickly adopted a more pragmatic approach that led to a majority of popular votes for the presidency.

Following its narrow defeat in the 2002 election, the MAS party began an internal transformation. While Morales’s rival (Felipe Quispe) was denouncing whites and mestizos, the MAS party was reaching out to them. The MAS allied with a mestizo-dominated party, the Movimiento Sin Miedo, which was led by the mayor of La Paz. Additionally, the MAS expanded its platform to include a broad-based platform of grievances shared by the urban whites and mestizos.¹⁴⁵

B. PERU’S ATTEMPTS AT BOLIVIANIZATION

Peru’s cocalero efforts at modeling their movement like the nationally powerful one in Bolivia began with the end of the Fujimori regime and the opening up of political associational space. The administration of President Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) was firmly against the idea of allowing free coca production. As he sought to repair the damages done to government institutions throughout the Fujimori era, he rarely took notice of cocaleros until they gained national attention through their repertoire of protest. The Toledo doctrine emphasized alternative development over eradication of the coca plant, even though he continued to pursue eradication goals as the proposals for new solutions were being discussed. At first, the cocaleros sought dialogue with Toledo’s

¹⁴³ Merilee Serrill Grindle and Pilar Domingo, *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 2003), 291.

¹⁴⁴ Crabtree and Whitehead, *Unresolved Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present*, 28–29; Madrid, “Bolivia: Origins and Policies of the Movimiento Al Socialismo,” 244–245.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 244.

government to resolve their differences. When talks in October 2001 and March 2002 failed to produce any results, the cocaleros from the UHV called for mass protest.¹⁴⁶

1. Peru's Cocaleros Appear United Nationally

When negotiations with the government were completely stalled, the cocaleros appeared more united than ever before. With the government continuing to pursue eradication efforts, the cocaleros from the Monzón Valley marched on Lima in June 2002, followed by mass protests in the UHV and a show of solidarity from the coca growers in the VRAE. The support from the VRAE is important to note because no eradication efforts were ongoing there at the time. Because the collective action was national and succeeded at gaining the attention of the Toledo government it appears that the cocalero movement achieved a scale shift to the national level, but this action was simply a façade that masked the true weakness of the movement. Peru's cocaleros soon demonstrated their inability to overcome internal divisions, even though opportunities for mobilization were greater than ever before. Additionally, their attempts to borrow frames of protest from Bolivia proved futile because of a credibility problem.¹⁴⁷

a. Frames of Protest: Radical and Pragmatic Approaches

Sidney Tarrow found that a collective identity is a critically important factor for the creation of a social movement.¹⁴⁸ As shown in the previous chapter, the way Bolivia's cocaleros framed their mixed identity ranged from indigenous to peasants, and later as nationalists. In Peru, this framing of mixed identities was complicated by very diverse economic, social, and ethnic backgrounds.¹⁴⁹ Attempting to replicate the success of Bolivia's cocaleros in framing their movement as an indigenous one, the cocaleros of Peru seized upon the domestic opportunity with the demise of the Fujimori

¹⁴⁶ Isaias Rojas, "Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy," in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: the Impact of U.S. Policy*, ed. Coletta A Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2005), 215–216.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Motion: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

¹⁴⁹ Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 214–215.

regime and sought to unite their regional members. In Bolivia, the work of elevating indigenous discourse to a prominent position in Bolivian politics had been accomplished for cocaleros because of the “first-generation” Katarista movement.¹⁵⁰ A majority indigenous population with deeply rooted traditions of chewing coca leaves easily internalized the indigenous frame and built upon the common identity. In contrast, Peru’s indigenous movements were weak and regional by comparison, except for the Southern department of Puno.¹⁵¹ Beginning in 2002, coca leaders in Peru began to appropriate some of the language used by the Bolivian cocaleros after they met with Evo Morales, the current MAS party leader. As a slogan, they adopted “*Coca o Muerte. Venceremos*” meaning, “Coca or Death. We Shall Prevail.”¹⁵² This declaration indicated a radical approach, compared to a more pragmatic approach that merely sought dialogue with the government. At the same time, cocalero leaders spoke of the *hoja sagrada* (sacred leaf) as a symbol of Peruvian identity. In Bolivia, the idea of the coca leaf as a sacred part of their indigenous history was widely accepted among society, though some remained disapproving of its other uses. But in Peru, coca leaf chewing was looked down upon by the majority of society.¹⁵³ This difference meant that radical frames would not help Peru’s cocaleros in building alliances.

These first attempts at forming a national unity around an indigenous tradition of coca in Peru proved unsuccessful. First of all, the frames were overtly militant, signaling to policymakers and citizens alike that cocalero demands might result in the type of violence associated with Sendero Luminoso. Second, cocaleros outside of the VRAE, especially in the UHV, favored a more pragmatic frame that focused on peacefully engaging the government over its eradication policies. Further complicating the construction of a shared identity, the leaders of the coca growing regions lacked credibility themselves.

¹⁵⁰ Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*, 152–223.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 267.

¹⁵² Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 215.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 217.

b. Coca Leaders' Credibility Problems

The first nationally-recognized coca leader that emerged to unite the various coca growing regions in Peru had a credibility problem, unlike Evo Morales. Nelson Palomino came from a cocalero family in the VRAE, but was not a cocalero himself. Nevertheless, he was elected the National Confederation of Agricultural Producers of Peruvian Coca Regions (CONPACCP) first national leader. Palomino nonetheless emulated Morales by portraying the coca leaf as an important part of Peruvian collective identity. He regularly spoke of the *hoja sagrada* (sacred leaf) and represented himself as an indigenous person by wearing traditional garb and carrying around the Inca flag. Most importantly to the government, however, he used this discourse to promote the idea that all cultivation of coca was legitimate, whether destined for legal markets or not.¹⁵⁴ His language came to symbolize the radical approach. The Toledo government and the Peruvian people were wary of losing control over the VRAE to what they perceived might be a resurgent part of the Shining Path. As his reputation increased nationally among the coca growing regions, the government began to view him as an enemy of the state. He was arrested in February 2003 and charged with “support for terrorism, disturbance of the electoral process, the kidnapping of journalists, extortion, grand theft, domestic violence, and creating public disturbances.”¹⁵⁵ All of his charges were nationally televised and the link between Palomino and terrorism was firmly established in the minds of Peruvians. The terrorism charge was later dropped because the category was used as a blanket charge to restrict basic civil rights under the Fujimori regime.¹⁵⁶

2. Absence of Sympathizers

Two women from the UHV succeeded Palomino as leader of the CONPACCP: Nancy Obregón and Elsa Malpartida. Together, they brought a more pragmatic approach to protest and framing of the national movement. In addition to

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 210–211.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 211.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

ending violent protests in Huamanga, where Palomino was imprisoned, Obregón and Malpartida organized a mass cocalero march on Lima in 2003.¹⁵⁷ Cocaleros had participated in some mass demonstrations that received attention from the national government before, but none quite as large as the 2003 *Marcha de Sacrificio*. Borrowing a tactic from Peruvian campesinos and miners, the cocaleros used a peaceful three-week march through the Andes to the capitol of Lima. The protests drew much attention from the media, and cocaleros were able to demonstrate their new frames of protest with slogans like:

‘De pie, marchar y el pueblo va a triunfar’, (‘Walk ever onward on the path to victory’), ‘No somos terroristas, somos campesinos’, (‘We aren’t terrorists, we are campesinos’), ‘El Pueblo unido jamas sera vencido’ (‘A people that stands united can never be vanquished’) and of course the CONPACCP’s slogan ‘Coca o Muerte’ (Coca or Death).¹⁵⁸

The march resulted in Toledo first declaring that coca was a Peruvian tradition and then decreeing a number of concessions to coca growers. Among the concessions were promises of a suspension of all other national laws that called for eradication of coca, a gradual reduction of coca overall, and a limit on CORAH’s activities that restricted them to only eradicate new fields not registered with ENACO.¹⁵⁹ However, the government failed to implement the decree and the different cocalero organizations that participated in the march rejected the provisions of the decree and only served to divide them. Overall, cocaleros were able to unite across the countryside to march, but it was a march of only cocaleros. There were no sympathizers or allies that joined them in their struggle. In the end, the movement could not be sustained by cocalero activism alone. Without allies, cocaleros were doomed to experience but a brief moment as a national level movement.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 223.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 224.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

C. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND THE WEAK STATE

While Palomino was claiming the indigenous heritage of the coca leaf in Peru, coca prices for farmers reached an all-time high at nearly U.S. \$5 per kilogram.¹⁶¹ Cocaleros protested Palomino's imprisonment, treating him as a symbol of their plight. Palomino himself suggested that Toledo had arrested him because his government was weak and unable to deal directly with the social movement.¹⁶²

Continuing to play their traditional game of carrot and stick, the United States again demonstrated its ability to influence the relationship between the state and cocaleros. The United States was freshly aware of both the success of Banzer's Plan Dignidad in Bolivia, as well as the history of cocaleros and terrorism in Peru. Adding the context of the tragedy on 9/11, the United States was determined to deny any remaining terrorists a safe haven, and the means of accomplishing that task was through forced eradication of the coca fields. The U.S. ambassador began to promote frames like "coca-growing narcofarmers"¹⁶³ to marginalize the cocalero movement and have them treated as criminals. Because the Toledo government was weak and desperately needed international assistance it was especially susceptible to pressure from the United States. Thus, the government used counter-frames against their cocaleros, and domestic opportunities for mediation with the government remained mostly closed during the Toledo administration. When coupled with the radical frames used by cocaleros, this dynamic hindered cocaleros from making further alliances that might have enabled a scale shift during this period.

D. INTERNAL DIVISIONS LEAD TO A PURSUIT OF ALLIANCES

After the Marcha in 2003, internal divisions plagued the national cocalero movement in Peru. The supreme decree issued by Toledo was the main cause of division among cocaleros. Nancy Obregón and Elsa Malpartida signed an agreement that

¹⁶¹ Rojas, "Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy," 217.

¹⁶² Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 211.

¹⁶³ Rojas, "Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy," 217–223.

included a gradual reduction of coca nationwide. For the VRAE cocaleros, this was a mistake and a betrayal of the true cause. Immediately, the CONPACCP became an organization with support only from the Upper Huallaga. The VRAE cocaleros put their weight behind FEPAVRAE and continued to contest the national leadership of the CONPACCP. With the loss of support from other cocaleros, the CONPACCP did what arguably should have been a goal all along: they sought alliances with a broader sector of Peruvian society.¹⁶⁴

Initially, the cocaleros found willing allies in workers organizations, campesino federations, intellectuals, and student organizations. Many of these groups organized their own protests against the Toledo government and promised to join cocaleros in protest, but in reality, they never did. One example concerns a Free Trade Agreement that the Toledo government made with the United States and was set to take effect in June 2005. The cocaleros protested in the UHV, but the rest of the country remained silent.¹⁶⁵

Cocaleros next turned to sympathetic politicians for alliances. Most of the willing politicians were from the radical political left. Moreover, the politicians had a tendency to only support cocaleros around elections as a way of gaining national media attention. When the CONPACCP allowed some of the more radical political parties to participate in their national congress, it restricted the pragmatic discourse that Obregón was originally determined to maintain. When the “*Coca o Muerte*” slogan returned to the organization, it conversely kept other less radical organizations from making alliances with the cocaleros. Thus, the main political party to support Peru’s cocaleros became Ollanta Humala’s *Partido Nacionalista Peruano* (PNP). Yet this alliance was very different from the way Bolivia’s cocaleros had formed their own party amid a collapse of the traditional party system.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 226.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 226.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 228–229.

E. ANOTHER LOOK AT DECENTRALIZATION EFFORTS

Peru's efforts at decentralization present an interesting puzzle. On one hand, decentralization brought about an increase in political opportunities for cocaleros, at least for them to compete in municipal elections. Fujimori had recentralized control after the autogolpe in 1992, but his successor Toledo by restarting the decentralization that had created 13 regional governments in 1989.¹⁶⁷ Whether Toledo was attempting to pacify a slew of social movements, create opportunities for his own party to win local elections, or simply to further democracy is still a matter that scholars disagree on. However, most scholars still point to disenchantment with neoliberal policies as the main cause of social mobilization in Peru in the 2000s.¹⁶⁸ The most referred-to event that exemplifies this discontent is the protest that occurred in Arequipa in June 2002. In this case, citizens and local governments objected to the sale of state-owned electric companies and their popular uprising contributed to the weakening of the newly installed regime of Toledo.¹⁶⁹

Cocaleros, however, did not lead protests against neoliberalism nor did they make alliances with the other actors in these protests because at the time they were still intent on using the radical discourse of leaders like Palomino. The decentralization measures that Toledo put in place expanded the domestic opportunities for cocaleros, but also led to their own regionalization. With cocaleros spread from the UHV to the VRAE among other lesser areas, the concentration of support did not happen as it did in the Chapare of Bolivia. Cocalero leader Nelson Palomino even went as far as forcing the local population of the VRAE to boycott regional elections.¹⁷⁰ Eventually, cocaleros in the VRAE saw the most success in municipal level elections, but in the rest of Peru, other social movements were vying for their own spot. Indeed, the unionized structure of the cocaleros in Bolivia likely gave them a decisive advantage in selecting candidates and

¹⁶⁷ Moisés Arce, "The Repoliticization of Collective Action After Neoliberalism in Peru," *Latin American Politics and Society* 50, no. 3 (October 1, 2008): 43.

¹⁶⁸ N Burron, "Ollanta Humala and the Peruvian Conjuncture Democratic Expansion or 'Inclusive' Neoliberal Redux?," *Latin American Perspectives* (2012); Arce, "The Repoliticization of Collective Action After Neoliberalism in Peru."

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁷⁰ Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 210.

competing with other groups when compared to the cocaleros of Peru.¹⁷¹ Remarkably, other organized social movements such as the miners, peasants confederations, and the Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Amazon—AIDSEP) all reached out to their counterparts in Bolivia and Ecuador while the cocaleros appeared internally divisive and isolated from other movements.¹⁷²

F. COMPARING THE LEFT-TURN

In Bolivia, the rise of the MAS coincided with a strong turn to the political left. Many scholars argue that “disenchantment with market-oriented policies and the parties that implemented them”¹⁷³ is one of the main factors contributing to the rise of the Left in Bolivia and throughout Latin America. Whether or not a Left turn contributes to the rise of cocaleros is the subject of this section. With their roots in labor based organizations like the COB and CSUTCB, Bolivia’s cocaleros have always favored alliances with Leftist groups. However, cocaleros could rarely leverage left-of-center political parties for much of their movements’ history, simply because both countries shifted significantly to the political right with the start of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s.

In Bolivia, a decline in support for the traditional parties (such as the MNR) coupled with a growing negative perception of neoliberalism presented an opportunity for a new party to capture votes. Cocaleros participated in two major protests that exemplified this growing disenchantment. The Water War of 2000 and the Gas Wars of 2003 ultimately led to the downfall of Sanchez de Lozada and further solidified the nationalist and antiestablishment sentiments among the general population, but especially among the majority indigenous voters. Evo Morales and the MAS were able to channel these feelings into support for the MAS platform, which was the most inclusive indigenous based party in the 2005 elections. The MAS not only won support from those

¹⁷¹ A Bebbington, M Scurrah, and C Bielich, “Mapping Current Peruvian Social Movements,” Manchester: Peruvian Centre for Social Studies (2008).

¹⁷² Burron, “Ollanta Humala and the Peruvian Conjuncture Democratic Expansion or ‘Inclusive’ Neoliberal Redux?,” 14–15.

¹⁷³ Madrid, “Bolivia: Origins and Policies of the Movimiento Al Socialismo,” 239.

who self-identified as indigenous during this left turn, but the shift enabled them to capture the traditional populist voters—the urban whites and mestizos who shared a left-of-center orientation. Because of Bolivia’s traditional party collapse amid a growing disenchantment with government economic policies, cocaleros were able to secure alliances that previously shared few overlapping goals or grievances. Additionally, Bolivia’s relatively peaceful internal dynamics (no insurgency or civil war) since democratization in 1982 meant that the political left was not immediately associated with radical Maoist or terrorist groups, as was the case in Peru.

Peru’s government remained right-of-center through the administration of Toledo (2001-2006) and ironically the same through the second administration of Alan Garcia (2006-2011). The reason for Peru’s late turn to the left in 2011 with the election of Humala coincides with the hypothesis of why cocaleros could not build their base and organization. As discussed before, the cocaleros of Peru had little opportunity to organize or mobilize due to the internal conflict between the state and Sendero Luminoso. According to leading scholars, “the social forces that sustained Peru’s electoral Left were thrown into disarray in the 1990s, and the Left, fractured and demoralized, was unable to rebuild its social base and party organization.”¹⁷⁴ How Garcia later returned to the political arena as a right of center candidate with the APRA party is beyond the scope of this thesis. The evidence that Peru’s cocaleros remained divided and regional throughout the administrations of Toledo and Garcia points to a single correlation—cocaleros did not scale shift past the regional level in the absence of a political Left turn in their country. Therefore, a more useful comparison is between Peru and Bolivia after they both eventually elected left-of-center candidates to the presidency.

Ollanta Humala has symbolized a shift to the Left in Peru primarily through his ardent nationalism and opposition to foreign companies that are responsible for the exploitation of Peru’s natural resources, much like Evo Morales did in Bolivia. Also like Morales, Humala promised cocaleros an end to forced eradication efforts and a distancing

¹⁷⁴ Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M Roberts, “Introduction,” in *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2011), 394–395.

of relations with the United States.¹⁷⁵ Additionally, he planned to focus on state-led internal development that would lead to a redistribution of wealth. While Humala was decidedly anti-establishment, the market reforms in Peru were more successful than in most of Latin America. Therefore, there is a large difference between Bolivia and Peru; the former became completely disenchanted with market policies, while the latter thought favorably of them. How then can Humala's election in 2011 be explained? According to Madrid, Humala's election can be seen as a growing desire to address a large number of inequalities that exist between Peru's coastal areas and the highlands and Amazon.¹⁷⁶

It was not long before Humala declared an end to forced eradication and then promptly reversed his decision—a result of consistent pressure from the United States to maintain such policies. While his presidency marks a turning point for Peru, it has not meant the reprieve for cocaleros that was achieved in Bolivia under Morales. In the words of the Ucayali chamber of commerce president, “It's the same policy as the previous government...You have to have to go on strike or create stoppages just to sit down and talk.”¹⁷⁷

G. CONCLUSION

This chapter has explained the rise of Bolivia's cocaleros as a combination of several factors. First, cocaleros enjoyed political associational space while still subject to pressure from the United States. Though the administrations of Banzer, Quiroga, and Goni all continued forced eradication in some form, cocaleros were able to scale shift the level of their movement through collective action that was mostly unimpeded by the state. Second, Bolivia's cocaleros made political alliances with the urban whites and mestizos that contributed to the electoral success of the MAS in the 2005 presidential election. Additionally, cocalero participation in the Water War of 2000 and the Gas Wars in 2003 demonstrated that alliances work both ways. Third, collaboration with other

¹⁷⁵ Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America*, 137.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 136–138.

¹⁷⁷ Naomi Mapstone, “Coca Farmers Throw Down Gauntlet in Peru,” Ft.com, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/41e92bc2-de99-11e0-a228-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2a1uaDJ5F>, accessed July 24, 2013.

social movements contributed to a united political party under an indigenous leader and coca grower himself, Evo Morales.

In contrast to the Bolivian cocaleros, Peru's regional cocalero movements could not unite under a single leader or a political party. Internal divisions and alliances with leftist political parties discredited their movement. Though decentralization measures were restored under Toledo, Peru's cocaleros could not take advantage of them to scale shift their movement because they had to compete with other social movements. Even though political associational space created an opportunity for the "Bolivianization" of Peru's cocalero movement, the inability to coalesce into a political party or make alliances with other movements severely limited their influence.

Finally, this chapter has ruled out the hypothesis that a turn to the political Left is a factor for cocalero mobilization. The MAS party provided an anti-establishment alternative to the traditional parties—a niche that proved to be popular as Bolivians (especially the majority indigenous ones) became disenchanted with the effects of neoliberal reforms. Since Morales and the MAS party came to power in 2006, they have championed alternative development programs over forced eradication, while seeking to reduce the amount of coca that is potentially diverted for the cocaine trade.¹⁷⁸ The cocaleros eventually gained direct access to the highest levels of government decision-making through the election of Morales, but Peru's cocaleros did not fare so well under their left turn. When Peru elected Humala in 2011, they too were upset with the level of foreign influence over their country, especially involving the exploitation of their natural resources. But when it came to the issue of coca, Humala's promises proved void like his predecessors.

¹⁷⁸ Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl, "Social Control: Bolivia's New Approach to Coca Reduction," *Latin American Perspectives* 37, no. 4 (2010): 197–213.

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V. CONCLUSION

The previous chapters show that cocalero movements in Peru and Bolivia took different trajectories under their new democracies. The internal dynamics of the cocalero movements at times used similar frames and tactics, but success in achieving a scale shift did not rest on replication alone. Other structural factors affected the ability of cocaleros to mobilize and forge alliances. Such factors within the scope of this thesis include international pressure, constraints on political associational space, and decentralization measures. The analysis shows that these highly polarizing social movements do not always determine their own fate.

A. THE “SCORES”

This thesis analyzed the importance of factors at the international, national, and subnational level. For the international level, my “score” was determined by the presence of foreign pressure that threatened the political or economic status of cocaleros, and whether or not the cocalero movement used the presence of such pressure to claim unjust intervention in national affairs. At the national level the score was determined by how different executives either allowed for political associational space or kept it closed. Finally, the subnational level looked at factors that allowed cocaleros to take advantage of decentralization measures. The decentralization measures, when enacted, provided greater resources and positions of authority at the municipal level. Specifically, political associational space, the presence of a dominant organizational structure in a specific geographic area, and internal movement dynamics were factors that show a clear difference between the two cocalero movements. Certainly there are additional factors that this thesis did not account for at each level. However, these factors appear to be the most salient for cocaleros and social movements in general.

The overall research question I posed was: What explains the variation in cocalero mobilization between Peru and Bolivia? Using the idea of the scale shift, I sought to understand factors that either inhibited or helped cocalero movements build broad-based political alliances. The first question I had to ask after the major research question was:

Why do cocaleros mobilize? Goldstone and Tilly show that there are two overarching paths that drive social mobilization in general: threat and political opportunity.¹⁷⁹ Most of the literature on cocaleros focuses on the effects of U.S. policy and determine that the threat of forced eradication is the primary causal factor in cocalero mobilization. As this thesis has shown, however, cocaleros from different regions also mobilize under open political associational space. Additionally, coca growers not targeted by government eradication forces may mobilize to show solidarity with the greater movement. This thesis finds that political opportunity plays a greater role in setting the conditions needed to achieve a scale shift than any other factor. In my analysis, this is a national level factor. Yashar defines political associational space as “the de facto existence of freedom of association and expression. It is not reducible to regime type; it is not equal to democracy.”¹⁸⁰ Others define the same concept as “the probability that social protest actions will lead to success in achieving a desired outcome.”¹⁸¹ This analysis of the cocalero movements in Peru and Bolivia has shown that under conditions of democracy, there can be closed associational space as in the case of Hugo Banzer. His unwillingness to negotiate with cocaleros hindered the cocalero movement in Bolivia, but only temporarily. Upon his early exit from office, cocaleros took advantage of the more inclusive approaches taken by successive administrations. In the case of Peru, a more serious example of closed associational space existed in the 1980s as cocaleros were prohibited from forming their own organization at the hand of Sendero Luminoso. In the 1990s, President Fujimori again closed off associational space and re-centralized the government as he fought and successfully concluded Peru’s civil war. Near the end of his administration and into the Toledo years and beyond, cocaleros had greater opportunities, but internal movement dynamics prevented a scale shift.

¹⁷⁹ J A Goldstone and C Tilly, “Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in the Dynamics of Contentious Action,” in *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001).

¹⁸⁰ Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*, 76.

¹⁸¹ Goldstone and Tilly, “Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in the Dynamics of Contentious Action,” 128.

B. THE CHOICE BETWEEN RADICAL AND PRAGMATIC FRAMES

Now looking at the internal dynamics of cocalero movements in Peru and Bolivia and their ability to scale shift the level of their movement, there are striking differences that explain why Bolivia's groups succeeded in forming a broad based inclusive political party and Peru's cocaleros struggled to form a national movement even when associational space existed. Through examination across time, cocalero movements in both countries rose or fell on their ability to make political alliances. Within a movement, there was a choice to use either radical or pragmatic frames. The use of the indigenous frames does not have a clear correlation with one or the other. In Bolivia's case, cocaleros built upon past success from the Katarista indigenous movement, claiming the right to grow coca as part of their indigenous heritage. When Peru's cocaleros tried to imitate Bolivia in the 2000s, the frames were seen as radical and associated with Sendero Luminoso. Though cocaleros in the 1980s formed alliances with Sendero out of economic necessity and occasionally the two groups coexist in the VRAE, the linkage has been more fanciful than concrete. Cocalero leaders in Peru eventually learned the futility of using the radical frames and took a more pragmatic approach, instead focusing on integration and alternative development goals.¹⁸² The tactics did not have to change with a pragmatic approach; nonviolent protest and general strikes were still very much a part of cocaleros' repertoire. Cocaleros using pragmatic frames has not achieved Bolivianization in Peru. While social movement theory suggests the chances of a scale shift are greater, Peru's cocaleros remain buoyed by other factors, especially their internal divisions and inability to attract a broader sector of society.

While cocalero movements like the Peruvian one can increase the likelihood of attracting outside support for their movement through pragmatic framing, the opportunity structures must first be present. Both are necessary conditions to reach higher levels, but neither condition is sufficient for a scale shift. Even under open associational space, radical framing within the movement can inhibit the movement's expansion.

¹⁸² Van Dun, *Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru*, 29.

C. THE WAY FORWARD FOR BOLIVIA'S MOVEMENT: IS ATTRACTING BROADER SUPPORT POSSIBLE?

Since being elected president of Bolivia, Evo Morales introduced his social control approach to drugs, “coca yes, cocaine no.”¹⁸³ While this approach appeased his cocalero base, Morales has had a tougher time in international relations, especially with the United States. Morales expelled the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in 2009, then USAID in 2013.¹⁸⁴ At the same time, however, his administration touts a reduction in overall coca cultivation levels through voluntary measures.¹⁸⁵ Morales’s 2013 victory for coca growers in the United Nations shows that on the international level, he can use multilateral institutions to represent the interests of cocaleros. However, the decision to recognize the indigenous right of coca chewing applies only to Bolivia.

D. WILL PERU'S COCALERO MOVEMENT EVER REACH THE NATIONAL LEVEL?

There is still doubt as to the credibility of coca growers in Peru who claim the same indigenous rights as Bolivia. Though the Humala administration did not object to Bolivia’s exception, it has not pursued the same rights for its cocaleros. Though many of the factors that contribute to cocalero mobilization exist, the internal dynamics of the Peruvian movement are likely the main factor holding them back from a scale shift. Combined with a slew of other social movements, all of them vying for attention, it is doubtful that Peru’s cocalero movement will ever scale shift to become a national influence centered on coca politics.

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

This thesis has shown that government counter-framing can severely inhibit a cocalero movement from achieving a scale shift. Framing coca growers as drug traffickers and terrorists may inhibit a national level movement, but eventually the frames

¹⁸³ Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl, “Social Control: Bolivia’s New Approach to Coca Reduction,” *Latin American Perspectives* 37, no. 4 (2010): 198.

¹⁸⁴ “Bolivian President Evo Morales Expels USAID,” Bbc.Co.Uk, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22371275>, accessed August 17, 2013.

¹⁸⁵ Farthing and Kohl, “Social Control: Bolivia’s New Approach to Coca Reduction,” 207.

can be counter-productive as they limit a government's options. Many governments have a policy that prohibits them from negotiating with terrorists. When cocaleros are framed as such, options that include negotiation are automatically discarded in favor of one option: repression.

F. FRAMING AND ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT

As seen in the cases of Bolivia and Peru, forced coca eradication was usually combined with some sort of alternative development effort. Most of the time, however, these programs were half-hearted efforts or completely underfunded. The economic feasibility of such programs is a discussion outside the scope of this thesis, but when a government counter-frames with radical labels like drug traffickers and terrorists, it becomes difficult to know whom to target for repression and whom to target for reintegration.

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